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“The proposition that the existence and nature of a tragic 
choice depends on which society confronts the tragic choice is a 
truism -- after all, whether a value is regarded as fundamental, to 
say nothing of the facts of scarcity, will vary from society to 
society -- and one may justifiably balk at an extended discussion 
that professes to support that proposition. What may prove more 
interesting, however, are examples of societies which present 
rough concurrences with regard to the status given to the value of 
life and equal treatment, and approximate equivalences of 
economic conditions, but which seem to display quite different 
approaches to a problem all regard as tragic. Such an exercise 
should act to show the incandescent role of a society‘s own 
conception of the values at stake and of the legal tradition which 
must cope with the conflict“ 1. 
 
Introduction 
July 16, 1982 is a date which will never be forgotten by the world’s bleeding 
disorder community. The Center for Diseases Control of Atlanta (CDC) alerted that three 
hemophiliacs, factor VIII massive recipients, had died as a result of the typical pathology 
which at that time was known as a sign of a new, deadly disease2.  
The day before, coincidentally, the most prominent experts and authorities of the 
Italian blood system were reunited in Rome at the “First focus panel on the national blood 
plan”. The Director of the Italian Superior Health Institute (ISS) officially presented his 
proposal to solve the endemic shortage that ever since had affected the Italian blood 
system. Incidentally, he made mention of the controls over blood products and stated:  
 
“...without doubt, since blood products require high technological 
standards for their manufacture, they are industrial pharmaceutical specialties. 
They are subject to authorization and therefore subordinated to controls by the 
Health Authority... [These controls are] to be performed on the productive 
plants previously authorized, on raw plasma and on each batch of final 
product. Today, however, controls on the original raw plasma by the [Italian] 
health authority is practically impossible, either for lack of regulations such as 
those enacted by the American Food and Drug Administration for the 
collection of “original plasma for further fractionation”, or because Italian 
industries, given the absence of such regulations, often prefer to import half-
purified plasmatic fractions from abroad”3.  
 
                                                          
1 G.CALABRESI, P.BOBBIT, Tragic choices, 1978, New York, at 177. 
2 CDC, Pneumocystis carinii pneumonis among persons with hemophilia A, in Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report, 1982; 31:365-7; CDC, Possible transfusion associated acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), Ibid., 1982; 31:652; J.F. DESFORGES, AIDS and preventive treatment in 
hemophilia, in N.Eng.J. of Med., 1983, 308:94; Preventing AIDS transmission: should blood donors be 
screened?, in Medical News, February 4, 1983. 
3 F.POCCHIARI, Il problema sangue: proposta di soluzione, paper delivered at the “Giornata di 
studio sul piano nazionale sangue, Rome”, July 15, 1982, in La trasfusione di sangue (hereinafter: TS), 
1983, 4:274, 283. 
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These admissions sound today as a lost warning. But at that time, adequacy was 
still the "magic word" in the Italian blood system. The issue was to improve the 
availability of whole blood and, above all, of plasma.  
At the beginning of the ‘80s, the Italian supply of whole blood could meet only 
about 2/3 of what was estimated to be the optimal quantity for the national needs. The 
shortage of plasma was much more striking. 95% of the vital liquid from which the 
hemophiliac factors could be obtained had to be imported4. This dependency on imported 
plasma was a source of concern for the Italian blood policy-makers. Further to the 
financial burden, there was the fear that the national inability to supply plasma for 
industrial production of coagulation factors might have exposed Italy to unexpected 
shortages.  
Nobody could then foretell that import-dependency in plasma could also be an 
extremely dangerous pattern in the event that a new viral threat should appear in the 
bloodstream. Aware of the inability to perform adequate controls on each batch of 
imported blood products, experts at that time blindly relied on the “prestigious” severity 
of the American regulations.  
Not even Pier Mannuccio Mannucci, the Italian internationally renown expert on 
clotting disorder pathologies, could imagine that this importation was already slowly 
carrying a lethal virus in the immune systems of many Italian hemophiliacs. His speech, 
as Scientific Secretary of the Italian Hemophilia Foundation (IHF), at the International 
Conference on Plasmapheresis held in Milan two months before the CDC warning, 
reveals unconditional trust in the American blood and plasma regulations: 
“(I)n Italy and in other countries plasmapheresis is seen by the medical 
world, and particularly by the blood bankers, as a sort of devil. Its image is 
associated with crowds of undernourished people from developing countries, 
queuing up in front of dirty blood banks to donate their blood only to be 
deprived of their scanty plasma proteins for a few dollars. The medical 
profession must be aware that such ‘wild’ plasmapheresis has now been 
abandoned practically everywhere, and that plasma made available to 
commercial manufacturers comes from plasmapheresis stations, fully 
controlled and approved by national regulatory agencies, such as the Food and 
Drug Administration in the USA (...) On the other hand, even those not giving 
credit to these imaginative stories and dreadful pictures are nevertheless 
deeply concerned with the fear that intensive plasmapheresis might be 
dangerous for the health of the donor (...). These preoccupations must be dealt 
with and dissipated because there must be a strong guarantee that the health of 
those who give their plasma for humanitarian purposes is not endangered by 
plasmapheresis”5. 
 
In that crucial summer of 1982, therefore, Italy was still facing the structural 
inadequacy of its blood system to overcome the shortage of blood and plasma supply. The 
                                                          
4 POCCHIARI, ibid., 275. 
5 P.M.MANNUCCI, Availability of plasma fractions for therapeutic use in Italy - Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Plasmapheresis 82, Milan, 27-28 May 1982, in La ricerca in clinica e 
laboratorio, 1983, 13:1. See also, in the same occasion, the reassuring picture depicted by J.L.TULLIS, 
Current plasmapheresis practice in the United States, Ibid., 11; and L.M.ALEDORT ET AL, Impact of factor 
VIII deficiency on clotting factor utilization in the United States, ibid., 33. 
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regulations that shaped the system had been codified 15 years before, and the debate over 
the need for a radical reform had been going for years.  
Meanwhile, the Italian blood system, like all others systems of the industrialized 
nations, had had to confront a spanking new technological challenge. The advent of 
industrial AFC (Antihemophiliac Factors Concentrates) in the ‘70s revolutionized the 
relationship between a class of chronic patients and their disease for the first time in the 
history of medicine. Updating the blood system in order to enable it to handle the 
increasing demand for this new therapeutic reality was the challenge. 
Structurally bound to a web of detailed technical regulations, which had been 
conceived according to the scientific knowledge of the second half of the ‘60s, the Italian 
blood system was caught completely unprepared to accept this technological and 
organizational challenge. Its guidelines were inspired by a rigid paradigm of bureaucratic 
centralism. These not only ignored the peculiar socio-antrophological features emerged 
during the early history of the Italian blood system, but proved to be refractory to 
technological development.  
 
The Italian Blood System in Historical Retrospective 
The development of the Italian blood system was originally spontaneous and 
entirely based upon a free associative tendency. After Landsteiner’s crucial discovery of 
the Ab0 system at the beginning of the century, and the impetus given to the therapeutic 
use of blood by the First World War, the few Italian hospitals that could provide blood 
transfusions had lists of paid suppliers. The mercenary practice fixed the prices and a 
single transfusion could cost the equivalent of several months’ of an average wage.  
The first initiative to promote the culture of voluntary blood donation was 
prompted by the enthusiasm of a Milanese physician, Davide Formentano, who in 1927 
organized the first group of unpaid donors around his hematological practice. This pioneer 
associative undertaking led, two years later, to the official foundation of AVIS (Italian 
Voluntary Blood Association), the first association of its kind in Italy. AVIS’s original 
goals were to satisfy the growing need for blood by organizing a network of regular 
donors under constant medical control, to fight the blood trade, to spread the idea that 
blood is a natural and anonymous gift and to enhance scientific knowledge of transfusion 
practice. These principles have, since then, shaped the development of the Italian 
voluntary blood donor organizations.  
Closely supported by the pioneers of the Italian transfusion medicine, AVIS 
quickly developed in the Northern regions as a unique example of a civic and laical 
associative endeavor in a society still deeply imbued by Catholic clericalism. Soon this 
spontaneous growth of the culture of voluntary blood donation was endangered by the 
general regulatory plan with which the fascist regime sought to structure the public health 
administration according to its own ideology. Mussolini himself requested Formentano to 
add the letter F (for fascist) to the acronym of the new-born association.  
The Duce’s desire was left unfulfilled. Nevertheless, after the Regio Decreto 
(King’s Decree) issued in 1934, not only was the collection of blood and the transfusion 
practice embedded into a pyramidal system of authorizations and administrative bodies 
(ranging from municipalities to the ministerial buildings that had been just erected by the 
regime in Rome), but also the role of professional donors, who supposedly earned their 
livelihoods by selling blood, was legally acknowledged. 
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Apart from the fascist policy of admitting the pricing of blood, the increasing 
therapeutic use of the vital liquid pushed legal scholars of the time to speculate on its 
juridical nature. The scant availability of blood supply brought Francesco Carnelutti, one 
of the most prominent legal scholars of the time, to argue in favor of legalizing the taking 
of blood against the donor’s consent, if this was necessary to save the recipient’s life6.  
According to the absolute concept of ownership inherited from Roman law, blood 
was legally considered to be the property of the donor also when parted from the donor’s 
body, although the Civil Code then in force did not explicitly regulate the use of the 
human body or parts of it. The issue caused a lively debate before the enactment of the 
new codification in 1942.  
A draft proposal generally stated that an act of self-deprivation, implying a 
prejudice to the human body, was permitted if not contrary to the law and morality. But, 
once enacted, this text was amended solely to take into account the human body’s ability 
to regenerate blood. By endorsing the idea that only "an act of disposition implying 
permanent prejudice to the human body" was against the law7, the newly enacted Civil 
Code (which today is still in force) clearly stated that the legislators wanted to encourage 
the transferability of blood. But the general rule did not bind policy-makers to a given 
stance toward the philosophy of the blood collection system: either a market approach or a 
generosity-based system could be conceived for the future8. 
The drama of the war heightened the altruistic spirit of blood donation. After the 
collapse of the fascist public health structure, the new-born Italian Government attempted 
to restructure the blood system. A monopoly over blood collection was granted to the 
Italian Red Cross, which was then the only non-profit health organization officially 
recognized by the government. This attempt represented a threat for the spontaneous and 
voluntary-based commitment of AVIS. After a few years of political pressure, the Red 
Cross’ legal monopoly over the sector was abrogated and AVIS was recognized by the 
Government as a non-profit public institution devoted to the spread of the culture of 
voluntary blood donation.  
Thereafter, and for almost twenty years, a long regulatory silence fell on any 
blood-related matter. Paradoxically, this was a time of profitable cooperation between 
donor associations and the first transfusion centers, which, by the end of the ‘40s, were 
being autonomously organized by the major hospitals of the country. AVIS, which today 
is still by far the leading Italian non-profit organization in the voluntary collection of 
blood, structured itself on a territorial basis.  
A strong presence in the local community became thereafter the pattern that 
permitted a slow but steady diffusion of the culture of voluntary blood donation in the 
country. On the AVIS example, smaller organizations of blood donors started to operate, 
some with religious inspiration like the FRATRES, others with the aim of serving the 
needs of big hospitals.  
The Italian Immuno-hematology and Blood Transfusion Society (SIITS-AICT, 
today SIMTI) was founded in 19549, when a group of physicians, who managed the few 
                                                          
6 F.CARNELUTTI, Problema giuridico della trasfusione di sangue, in Il Foro italiano (hereinafter: 
Foro It.), 1938, IV, 89. 
7 Art. 5 of the Italian civil code. 
8 F.DEGNI, Sulla trasfusione obbligatoria del sangue (a rejoinder to prof. Carnelutti), in Foro.it, 
1938, IV, 130. 
9 G.REALI, La storia della medicina trasfusionale, in TS, 1995, 2:72. 
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transfusion centers which then existed in Italy, decided to create a body similar to the 
American blood banks association. Their endeavor was to draw up uniform guidelines and 
to set up operational standards for the transfusion practice. 
In those years the complexity of blood transfusion grew proportionally with 
scientific and technical advancements. New knowledge in immunology solved many of 
the problems of blood incompatibility, while the introduction of new instruments 
revolutionized techniques. Direct transfusion was abandoned in the ‘50s in favor of 
special vacuum-prepared glass flacons with preservative solutions, which permitted a 
longer storage of blood in refrigerators10. The introduction of these technological 
improvements was left to the discretion of each head of local transfusion centers. Yet in 
1959, only three transfusion centers in the North could provide lyophilic plasma.  
The lack of a national policy explains the uneven development of the blood system 
across the country. The entire health care system was then lacking central coordination 
and even the establishment of the Health Ministry in 1958 left the blood sector 
substantially unregulated11. In the North, towns like Turin could already boast a blood 
collection center organized as a replica of an American blood bank, working in close 
cooperation with the local blood donor association. By contrast, in the South the situation 
was far from satisfactory.  
Indeed, the “gift philosophy” toward blood has always been much more culturally 
accepted in Northern Italy than in the South. This differing attitude between the North and 
South is even to this day a major problem for the Italian blood collecting policy. It reflects 
a deeply rooted difference in the social dynamics which exists between the individuals 
and their local community.  
It is, in fact, widely assumed that group loyalty encourages voluntary blood 
donation. The members of the group are willing to perform the altruistic act of donating 
blood for free, if they believe that some day this generosity will be returned by the 
group12. In the North this social pattern has traditionally proven to work within the local 
community, because of the strong sense of membership that links individuals to their 
community. But this has never been the case in Southern Italy, were group loyalty is 
shifted to the family and its entourage. Therefore, blood donation was likely to be 
performed in the South only when a member of this close-knit parental community was in 
danger of life and was the direct beneficiary of the gift13.  
Many of the difficulties encountered by the North-based AVIS in establishing 
roots within the social tissue of the Southern regions was explained by this unwillingness 
of considering blood donation as an “anonymous gift”.  
The “group loyalty” argument, then, would also explain why in those years (again, 
particularly in the South) the work-place was a favorite environment for blood collection. 
Within large firms, self-organized groups of workers promoted blood donation days to 
cover the occasional need for blood by fellow-workers or a member of their family.  
                                                          
10 W.MOLLA, Organizzazione e funzionamento di un centro trasfusionale, in Vº corso di 
aggiornamento per medici sulla trasfusione di sangue, 1959, AVIS Milan, 125. 
11 Law 13 March 1958, n. 296. As its institutional role, the ministerial body also supervised the 
Istituto Superiore della Sanità (ISS), established as national medical research institution in 1952. 
12 M.DOUGLAS, No free gifts. Introduction to Mauss’s essay on The gift, in Risk and Blame: Essays 
in cultural theory, 1992, London - New York, 155.  
13 G.CLERICO, Raccolta e allocazione di sangue: donazione, mercato ed intervento pubblico, in 
Rassegna giuridica della sanità, 1994, IV, 140. 
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The other side of the coin was the sale of blood. The mercenary practice was not 
yet legally prohibited and was still far from being eradicated. In emergencies, the 
beneficiary of a blood donation would have felt the moral obligation of providing a 
reward. The lack of educational efforts to increase the individual’s “docility” toward 
blood giving14, combined with the chronic shortage of blood, explained the flourishing of 
a vicious black market. The precious oro rosso (red gold) could give rise to extortion, 
when unscrupulous blood merchants would take advantage of the vital need for the 
donation of a particularly rare type of blood. The image offered by the director of a 
Southern blood bank is impressive:  
“(S)ometimes blood blackmarketeers loiter at the entrance to the 
transfusion center, waiting to contact the patient’s relatives. After negotiating 
a price they present themselves as friends of the patient. For us it is not easy to 
determine whether they are engaged in illegal transactions ...”15. 
 
In short, in the post-war period, during the ‘50s and the early ‘60s, the Italian 
blood system remained unregulated. Its development depended solely on the cooperative 
efforts of non-profit blood donor organizations and Italian transfusion doctors. 
Nevertheless, although contending with burgeoning differences among different parts of 
the country, the blood system evolved by benefiting from international scientific and 
technical exchanges (the congress of the International Society of Blood Transfusion was 
held in Rome in 1958, while Germany, England and the USA were the favorite 
destinations for young physicians who wanted to improve their skills). 
By the mid ’60s, the Italian Government had increased its institutional control over 
the National Health Service, by strengthening the bureaucratic structure of the Health 
Ministry. A strong call for the introduction of uniform standards and regulations was 
made by both the medical class and representatives of the voluntary blood donors 
associations.  
 
Blood and Bureaucracy: The 1967 Act  
Following an intense and lengthy debate in the legislative arena, the “Collection, 
preservation and distribution of human blood” Act came into force in 196716. This law, 
and the set of ministerial decrees which completed its general provisions, henceforth 
regulated virtually every aspect of the Italian blood system for twenty-three years. As of 
that time, the “juice of life”17 became a matter of State, justifying the Health Ministry’s 
supervision of its collection, processing and distribution. But, above all, this long-awaited 
State intervention marked the start-up of a stream of complex regulations. From then 
onwards, this stream will never dry up.  
According to the tradition of the Italian structure of the public administration 
(which historically date back to the fascist era) the blood system was once again 
                                                          
14 The first government-financed TV commercials on blood donation appeared on Italian television 
as late as 1971. 
15 N.SCARANO, Il dramma della raccolta di sangue [The blood collection drama], in Nel mese, 2, 
1976, 11.  
16 Law 14 July 1967, n.592. 
17 P.CAMPORESI, Il sugo della vita: simbolismo e magia del sangue, Milan, 1984 (now: id., The 
Juice of Life, New York, 1995. 
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hierarchically organized. Provincial blood boards were to be appointed by the Health 
Ministry as local agencies with the task of administering blood collection and distribution 
on a local basis. The broad composition of these boards reflected the view that blood 
administration was a matter of public interest, and therefore had to be democratically 
supervised by a wide range of representatives of the so-called “civic society”.  
No wonder, then, that these provincial bodies were conceived as small 
parliaments, where, besides blood experts and delegates from the blood donor 
associations, sat representatives of the army and even of the local health workers’ labor 
unions. The obvious result was an administrative elephantiasis which greatly impaired the 
efficiency and decision-making of these bodies. 
Conceived according to the “rule of legal bureaucracy”18, the system depicted by 
the Act could not take into account the local differences that could be discerned in the 
Italian attitude toward blood donation. Therefore, although formally establishing the same 
kind of local structures throughout the country, the law failed to envisage a system of 
coordination capable of balancing inter-regional differences in blood collection.  
The provisions addressed to regulate the manufacture and distribution of blood 
products, together with those describing the relative administrative controls, aptly 
expressed the bureaucratic nature of the system. According to each field of competence, 
provincial doctors, provincial blood boards, the Superior Institute of Health, up to the 
person of the Health Minister, were called upon to express advice or to release formal 
authorizations. From then on, every new blood or serum product was to be subjected to 
ministerial authority.  
The “Kafkaesquian bureaucracy” of the newly established system was 
characterized by a detailed set of second-level regulations. For example, legal provisions 
itemized the standard pieces of furniture that had to equip transfusion centers, whereas 
other provisions prescribed that to obtain plasma for further fractionation no more than 
twelve flacons of blood could be pooled. These technical regulations were condemned to 
quickly became obsolete and hamper the acquisition of new techniques. For instance, 
determining mandatory procedures for the production of antihemophilic cryoprecipitates, 
limiting to codified standards the exploitabilty of plasmapheresys, or prohibiting the 
storage of blood in plastic sacs became within a few years a legal non-sense.  
With respect to the selection of the blood donors, the law depicted the safety 
measures of the time. A major role was assigned to the general examination of the donor 
by the transfusion expert physician. Prevention of possible viral contamination relied on 
medical interviews, in order to bring to light previous pathologies in the donor’s medical 
history. 
 The venereal disease reaction was the only test legally prescribed, but the Act 
failed to assign an autonomous power of rule-making to the Health Ministry, in order to 
render the future introduction of compulsory tests simple and timely19.  
                                                          
18 I use this definition to summarize what Joseph LaPalombara has perfectly explained to non-
Italians: “...Italy is a lawyer’s paradise, and not just because Italians admire forensic skills. A prevailing 
lawyer’s mentality dictates that all possible contingencies regarding public policies must be anticipated and 
codified. This means that people are forever in search of what nuance “The Law” will or will not permit (...) 
one has the impression that without the Gazzetta Ufficiale, which publishes weekly updates of the country’s 
many legal codes, the country, or at least most of its institutions and transactions, would simply fall apart” 
(emphasis added), id., Democracy Italian Style, 1987, New Haven-London, 209. 
19 According to the Italian constitution, a parliamentary law is required to enable the executive 
power to regulate a given matter by means of ministerial decrees. 
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Import of blood and serum products was subjected to a complex procedure. 
Foreign products had to be tested by an Italian pharmaceutical company or health facility 
previously deemed qualified by the ISS to perform such tests properly. Once authorized, 
the importer was assumed legally responsible for the foreign product’s compliance with 
the quality standards set out by the Italian law for that given product20.  
Concerning the gratuitous nature of blood, the law did not take a clear stance. 
Although endorsing the principle that “blood can not be considered source of profit”, the 
law ambiguously envisaged the role of the “professional donor”, who was defined as 
someone remunerated for supplying blood. A standard price per donation was supposed to 
be quantified by a future ministerial provision, which never followed. Consequently, the 
pricing was left to the Provincial Boards.  
But what really betrayed the expectations of volunteer donors was that the 1967 
Act did not set forth a criminal provision to punish the mercenary practice. As a result, the 
only crime that could have deterred the activity of a blood merchant was the crime of 
usury, set out in the penal code. But sentencing for such a crime in the case of blood trade 
required evidence that the price asked for blood was “manifestly exorbitant”, according to 
the jurisprudence. Such a proof resulted very difficult to provide once in criminal court.  
A separate statute21, instead, granted what the AVIS’ representatives had been 
lobbying for. In order to encourage blood donation the worker’s right to a day of rest 
when giving blood was legally acknowledged. Employees giving their blood for free 
could receive their daily wages from the employer, who was then reimbursed by the State.  
In the space of a few years, every blood-related matter in Italy had received its 
rule.  
However, an important institutional factor very soon further complicated the 
administration of the blood system. In 1972 the State transferred a significant portion of 
its legislative and administrative functions to the Regions, thereby finally applying a 
constitutional provision that had remained inoperative since the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1948. As a consequence, the health sector was gradually decentralized and 
the newly-established regional councils acquired an important role in the administration 
of the health care system.  
This transfer entailed a delicate period of transition during which the complex 
system of checks and counter-checks typical of the Italian centralized ministerial 
bureaucracy had to be coordinated with the new regional order22. 
As early as 1975, when it was still unclear whether the new regional legislative 
councils had the power to regulate matters concerning blood, some regions started to 
promulgate acts which promoted the local activities of the blood donors associations. 
Each local association was to receive financial aid (covering the collection-related costs) 
proportional to the quantity of blood supplied to the regional health facilities23.  
Following the administrative decentralization of the ‘70s, the regionalization of the 
health system exerted a strong deal of influence on the blood sector, enabling each region 
                                                          
20 Ministerial Decree (hereinafter: DM) 15 September 1972. 
21 Law 13 July 1967, n.584. 
22 S.CASSESE, The higher civil service in Italy, in E.N.SULEIMAN, Bureaucrats & policy making. A 
comparative overview, 1984, New York-London, 66. 
23 S.SECHI, Iniziative legislative regionali in materia trasfusionale, in Atti del convegno “Giornate 
di studio sui problemi della trasfusione e della donazione di sangue, 1978, Bari, 67. 
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to develop its own system in accordance with local needs and, especially, with its own 
tradition toward free blood giving. 
In 1978 the Health System Reform Act stated that the guidelines regulating 
transfusion, blood collection and blood derivatives production had to remain nationally 
standardized, owing to their importance in order to ensure uniform health conditions 
throughout the country24. State authorities therefore retained their legislative prerogative 
over the blood sector. Yet, despite this general principle, it became obvious after the 1978 
Reform that the regulation of the blood collection system urged coordination with the new 
regional order25.  
The reform itself made reference to a Piano Nazionale Sangue (National Blood 
Plan), which would have made this coordination possible. But for the Italian Parliament 
this provision remained only a good intention: the plan was never realized and not until 
the 1990 reform did the Italian blood system become legally structured, according to the 
administrative autonomy of the regions. 
The advent of administrative regionalization, therefore, did not affect the history 
of cultural misgiving toward blood donation of the Southern regions26. Rather, it widened 
the geographical heterogeneity of the Italian blood system. Taking advantage of the new 
autonomy, some Northern regional administrations, like those of Tuscany and Lombardy, 
promptly conceived a system of regional coordination based on a network of agreements 
between transfusion centers and donors associations. This permitted to increase efficiency 
in blood collection by forestalling local blood surpluses and deficits27. Lombardy also 
established a regional center for the production of blood derivatives28.  
But the same prompt intervention of regional administrations could not be 
observed in the South29. In 1983, Southern regions were still a long way from achieving 
local adequacy in whole blood supply, whereas plasma was supplied in negligible 
quantities30. 
The Italian Bleeding Disorder Community in “the Age of Trust”.  
Until the ‘50s, hemophilia had been treated with transfusions of large quantities of 
plasma. Hemophiliacs were condemned to long periods of hospitalization and their life 
expectancy was extremely low31. In Italy, cryoprecipitates therapy became available in 
                                                          
24 Law 23 December 1978, n.833. 
25 M.ZANA, Il servizio trasfusionale tra tecnica e normativa: il parere del giurista, in Rivista italiana 
di medicina legale (hereinafter: RIML), 1985, 834. 
26 On the uneven capacities of administration displayed by regions when regionalism was 
implemented in Italy in the early ’70s, see F.SPOTTS, T.WIESER, Italy. A difficult democracy, Cambridge, 
1986, 226 and the analytical study of R.D.PUTNAM, R.LEONARDI, R.Y.NANETTI, La pianta e le radici, 
Bologna, 1985. 
27 In 1978 the Italian transfusion centers provided only 2,500,0000 of the 26,000,000 AFC 
consumed by Italian hemophiliacs. 80% of this scarce contribution to the national needs was made by only 
four Northern regions. See A.GHESSI, R.DE BIASI, Disponibilità e utilizzazione dei concentrati emofilici in 
Italia, 1978, Milan (source: IHF). 
28 Regional Law 7 June 1980, n.80. 
29 Compare the gloomy picture of the Apulia situation depicted in 1978 by the director of the local 
hemophiliac center: N.CIAVARELLA, Atti convegno “Giornate di studio sui problemi della trasfusione e 
della donazione di sangue, 1978, Bari, 61. 
30 See DE BIASI ET AL., La carenza di sangue nelle regioni meridionali [The shortage of blood in the 
Southern regions], in TS, 1983, 1. 
31 In the ’50s, 90% of the Italian hemophiliac population died before entering their twenties, 
C.RIZZO ET AL., Emofilia e lavoro: contributo statistico e considerazioni medico legali, in Difesa sociale, 
1992, 6:51. 
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the latter half of the ‘60s. A dose of factor VIII or IX could be obtained by pooling plasma 
from small groups of donors. In those years, the relatively simple technology used in this 
“artisan” manufacture of clotting factor concentrates became available at several 
transfusion centers. But the problem was the extreme paucity of fresh plasma. And the 
restrictive technical standards imposed on the exploitation of plasmapheresis on donors, 
which were issued at the beginning of the ‘70s, did not seem designed to address the 
issue.  
Besides, at that time, from a medical point of view it was unclear who had 
professional competence in treating the hemophiliac patient. Orthopedists treated 
arthropaties, which affected hemophiliacs as consequence of internal hemorrhages. 
Transfusion expert physicians produced and administered cryoprecipitates. 
Hematologists, of course, were competent ratione materiae.  
But the lack of coordination among these three categories of physicians reflected 
on the patients. Consequently, hemophiliacs had a compelling need for the establishment 
of ad hoc facilities for the treatment of their disease. When, on the eve of the ‘70s, the 
echo of the new “American treatment” (the industrial Anti Hemophilia Factors) spread 
among Italian hemophiliacs, this lack of landmarks resulted in a dilemma for many of 
them. To trust the physician who had them in charge and was still administering the “old” 
cryoprecipitates? Or, rather, to try to get these new concentrate factors by traveling to a 
(sometimes very distant) health facility, where, it was said, this new therapy could be 
obtained?  
It was in answer to these problems that in December 1969 a heterogeneous 
founding group, composed of parents of hemophiliac children, benevolent rich ladies from 
the Milan high society and some hematologists and transfusion expert physicians, 
established the Fondazione Italiana dell’Emofilia (Italian Hemophilia Foundation, 
hereinafter: IHF) in Milan.  
Following the example of other national hemophiliac organizations, which had 
established the World Federation of Hemophilia in 196332, the goals of IHF were to 
support and to raise funds for scientific research on the disease, to inform and educate 
hemophiliacs and their families, as well as to campaign for improved clinical and social 
assistance for the class. The new-born organization did not adopt the legal rules of a 
democratic association among hemophiliacs33. The choice of adopting the legal status of a 
Fondazione, illustrates how important it was for the founding members to obtain formal 
acknowledgment from the Italian State34. This would have permitted the IHF to assume 
                                                          
32 Current Studies in Hemophilia, Proceedings of the 3rd Congress of the W.H.F., in Bib. Haemat., 
1966, 26. 
33 In the Italian legal system a Fondazione is a non-profit organization characterized by the 
settlement of a fund legally bound to the pursuit of a given beneficial purpose. Conceptually, it is far more 
similar to a trust than to an association. In a Fondazione the new members may support its beneficial goals, 
but are not entitled to vote (or to be appointed as) the executive administrators of the organization. This 
inhibits the free associative dynamics, which instead may take place within the legal framework of an 
association. Asked to explain why a non democratic institution was chosen to represent the hemophiliacs’ 
action, the current President of IHF (who has held the office since 1969) answered that the choice was due 
to the fear that, once organized in an association, external forces could gain control of the hemophiliac 
organization, by manipulating the majority of the votes. This choice, he revealed, proved farsighted because 
pharmaceutical companies in several occasions had tried to gain such control. 
34 To begin to operate, a Fondazione must be recognized by a ministerial decree. Although this 
implies that the government has the power to supervise the activity of the organization, by future 
verification that the fund is administered according to the goals established in the act of settlement, this 
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an institutional vest with which to press the Government for an improved national health 
policy toward hemophilia. From the very beginning, the IHF’s action would be constantly 
characterized by the search of institutional visibility, to be pursued adopting a strategy of 
collaboration with institutional authority.  
The first IHF national congress was held in Milan in 1970. The Italian 
Government was openly requested not to further delay the implementation of a special 
policy for hemophiliacs, pointing out the example of France. Beyond the Alps, it was 
pointed out, the Association Française des Hémophiles had succeeded in obtaining from 
the Government the creation of a national network of specialized centers for the bleeding 
disorder community, as well as special forms of support for the hemophiliacs’ families35.  
The need for vesting the IHF’s claims with legal arguments was fulfilled by 
resorting to a law enacted in 196136. This law set out the tasks of special health care 
facilities which were to be established for the care and treatment of diseases considered of 
social relevance. The task of determining which disease could comply with the special 
provisions set forth in this existing statute was delegated to the Health Ministry.  
Therefore, the first political goal of the IHF became to have hemophilia legally 
declared a malattia sociale [disease of social relevance]. Taking advantage of this 
preexisting legal framework, it proved relatively easy for the IHF to obtain political 
attention for its claim. In 1972 a Health Ministry decree released the financial support for 
the establishment of a regional-based network of specialized medical centers for the study 
and treatment of hemophilia37.  
The final choice for a decentralized structure came at the end of a strategic dispute 
between the two classes of specialized professionals who participated in the scientific 
committee of the IHF. Transfusion expert physicians were in favor of the establishment of 
a national center specialized in the treatment of hemophilia in Rome, in order to 
concentrate research activity and AFC production in one place on a national level.  
By contrast, hematologists were convinced that only the most effective diffusion 
of special centers throughout the country could reduce, if not eliminate, the phenomenon 
of commuting that had, until then, characterized the hemophiliac’s need for constant 
medical assistance. By prevailing in this dispute, hematologists gained a definitive 
professional and institutional leadership in the treatment of hemophilia. The key positions 
as heads of the newly established centers were to come from their ranks.  
These centers became landmarks for the hemophiliac population: it was at these 
facilities that patients could receive the AFC which in the first half of the ‘70s were 
starting to be imported. Since supplementary regional regulations were necessary for the 
establishment of these centers, their implementation was uneven throughout the country. 
Nevertheless, by the year 1984, 31 centers had been established in Italy.  
Moreover, again at a regional level, hemophilia self-treatment became possible, 
enabling patients (or an assisting person) to intravenously administer blood products. 
Industrial AFC could be stored in ordinary refrigerators, and allowed hemophiliacs to 
maintain personal stocks of concentrates at home. The hospital-based therapy with 
                                                                                                                                                                              
formal act of recognition also has an important side effect. The organization, in fact, appears vested of 
institutional authority. And this was the first goal of the IHF founders. 
35 The final resolution of the congress became an open letter addressed to the Health Minister on 
May 18, 1970. 
36 President of the Republic Decree (hereinafter: DPR), 11 February 1961, n.249. 
37 DM 12 June 1972. 
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cryoprecipitates could be replaced by prophylactic treatment. The dream of preventing the 
occurrence of hemorrhages through periodical inoculation of AFC had become finally 
possible. Regional Acts provided for courses to be held in authorized hospitals, where 
hemophiliacs patients or their relatives could learn how to administer AFC38. Only on 
successful completion of such training programs could patients obtain the medical 
prescriptions required to obtain AFC in pharmacies.  
In the second half of the ‘70s the “miracle” of the new concentrate factors was 
bringing about a radical change in the life-style of the Italian hemophiliac39. It may appear 
secondary, but for the first time children, who until then had been compelled to live in a 
glass bowl, could start practicing sports40. Under the auspices of the IHF, local 
hemophiliac committees and associations were created at every regional center for the 
treatment of hemophilia.  
The information and advice on the disease that IHF members could receive at 
home via the national newsletter of the organization41, but also the mere fact of having the 
opportunity to meet at the centers other people in the same condition, gave hemophiliacs 
(and their families) a sense of being part of a community that never existed before.  
A quick process of group identification took place among individuals who were 
discovering that to be hemophiliac did not mean solely being a patient. The extraordinary 
reduction of the impairment effects of arthropaties, the newly acquired freedom from the 
dependence on constant assistance, offered to the hemophiliac the perspective of mingling 
with others and the possibility of attending social activities. The physical impairment, the 
external status associated with the disease, could no longer be detected42.  
The new social dimension of hemophiliacs also had other positive effects, perhaps 
less visible to the external world, but extremely important for their private life. It wasn’t 
rare, until the ‘70s, that the unexpected birth of a hemophiliac child was viewed, 
especially by the father, as a sort of “blood betrayal”. In such cases the education and care 
of the children were likely to be left to uncles or grandfathers. The lack of parental 
acceptance persisted even during adolescence, resulting in an additional psychological 
burden for the adult hemophiliac. Meeting other hemophiliacs’ parents, learning from 
their experiences, acted as a natural therapy for these phenomenons of psychological 
refusal43. 
In 1975, the then existing public health insurance funds (which in 1978 were 
amalgamated into the National Health Service) included AFC in their drug lists, 
qualifying these pharmaceutical products as “life-saving medicines” to be provided free of 
                                                          
38 Lombardy was the first region in Italy to enact this kind of regulation, see Regional Law 12 June 
1975, n.89. 
39 P.M.MANNUCCI, Z.M.RUGGERI, Hemophilia care in Italy, in Thrombos.Haemostas., 35:531-536, 
1976. 
40 Gli emofilici possono svolgere attività sportiva [Hemophiliacs can perform sport activity], in Il 
Corriere della Sera (hereinafter: CDS), 24 June 1975. 
41 The first Manualetto [handbook] containing a detailed set of therapeutic information for the 
hemophiliac was published by IHF in 1972. From then on, this publication was periodically sent to IHF 
members. It rapidly become the source of information for the community. These publications were financed 
by various pharmaceutical companies, and usually had the back cover advertising the latest AFC marketed 
by the financing company. 
42 R.ANDERSON, M.BURY, Living with chronic illness, London, 1988, 6. 
43 The existence of this phenomenon (which, as far as the present writer knows, has never been 
analyzed -- at least not in Italy) emerged in the course of an interview to Umberto Randi, the IHF Secretary. 
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charge to pharmacies, with the Treasury totally covering their cost44. IHF played a 
prominent role in achieving these results45.  
In the early ‘80s, the efforts to make effective what in the previous decade had 
been the IHF’s slogan had succeeded46. The majority of Italian hemophiliacs could (or 
would have soon be able to) get “AFC delivery on the home threshold”47. In 1978 an 
estimate in a study presented at the fourth triennial congress of IHF calculated that Italian 
hemophiliacs consumed 26,500,000 I.U. of factor VIII. Yet, no official and precise 
surveys had been conducted on the Italian bleeding disorder population. The incidence of 
hemophilia in Italy was estimated at a ratio of 15-20 patients per 100,000 male births.  
Therefore, the total number ranged from 3750 to 5000 hemophiliac subjects of a 
national male population of approximately 25,000,00048. In 1983 the average 
consumption of a single hemophiliac did not reach 20.000 I.U./year. Compared to foreign 
data, this quantity was deemed insufficient by experts: according to them the Italian 
hemophiliac was still under-treated49.  
Yet clearly, a vein of “therapeutic enthusiasm” had pervaded both doctors and 
patients. 
 
The Unheeded Lesson: The Trilergan Case 
Beside the triumphs of AFC in the treatment of hemophilia, the ‘70s saw the first 
hints of dangers implied by the use of blood products manufactured from large pools of 
donors.  
The discovery of the hepatitis B antigen50 -- in the mid ’60s -- was the first step 
toward the screening of blood for a virus recognized as a cause of iatrogenic disease in 
transfused patients since the ‘40s51. From 1969 onwards, the Australia antigen (HBsAG) 
screening techniques evolved rapidly52. With regards to the risk of hepatitis-tainted blood, 
                                                          
44 DM January 17, 1975 and DM August 2,1975. 
45 IHF promoted an intense congressional activity during the ’70s. 
46 P.M.MANNUCCI, L’emofilia curata a domicilio [Hemophilia treated at home], in CDS, May 1, 
1975, advocating the adoption of treatment for hemophiliacs at home. 
47 Self-treatment techniques were illustrated to hemophiliacs by the IHF handbooks. Concerning 
the risks of home self-treatment one of this companion explained in 1976: ”...the AFC administration is a 
substitutive therapy, that is, it is not an extraneous medication administered to the human body, but rather a 
factor obtained by human blood, which, though normally present, is absent or not sufficient in the 
hemophiliac’s body. Therefore, AFC administration may never have contraindications (except in presence 
of inhibitors), nor is the manifestation of harmful effects by overdose possible. This latter aspect must be 
stressed, since physicians often are fearful of administering excessive doses of AFC to patients: more is 
always better than less.” [italics in the original], IHF Manualetto n.4, 1976, 17.  
48 GHESSI, DE BIASI, Disponibilità e utilizzazione dei concentrati emofilici in Italia, 1978, Milan. 
49 F.RODEGHIERO, Terapia domiciliare dell’emofilia: aspetti medici ed organizzativi, in Atti del 
convegno “La terapia domiciliare dell’emofilia: esempio di medicina preventiva e riabilitativa”, Vicenza - 
28 May 1983, 26.  
50 G.DE STASIO, Il rischio trasfusionale, 1995, Milan, 2, quoting B.S.BLUNBERG ET AL., Multiple 
antigenic specifities of serum lypoproteins detected with sera of transfused patients, in Vox sanguinis, 1964, 
9, 128; id., Hepatitis and leukemia: their relation to Australia Antigen, in Bull. NY acad. med., 1968, 44, 
1566. 
51 MORGAN ET AL., Jaundice following administration of human blood products, in Brit. Med. J., 
1943, 1, 750; L.B.SEEF ET AL., A serological follow-up of the 1942 epidemic of post-vaccination hepatitis in 
the United States army, in N. Eng. J. Med. 316, 1987, 965. 
52 Screening methods advanced and improved remarkably in the lapse of a few years: the gel 
diffusion technique (1968); the elettrosineresys and blood agglutination (1970); the radioimmunologic 
technique or RIA (1972), DE STASIO, quoted above, 4. 
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the Italian blood collection regulations issued in 1971 envisaged only a general medical 
interview. Donors with a medical history of jaundice were excluded from donation. But 
no testing was legally imposed or even suggested.  
One may well wonder how the Italian ministerial decision-making interacted with 
scientific evidence concerning improved techniques of HBsAG screening, and how the 
implementation of the latter was institutionally handled.  
The first trace of institutional warning appeared in a Circolare, a ministerial 
communication, in 197153. It outlined that, since several pharmaceutical industries had 
already started marketing the necessary reagents, the systematic introduction of the 
screening of blood to be transfused could no longer be postponed and suggested that all 
transfusion centers should introduce screening. A long institutional silence followed this 
first ‘soft’ and general sign of alert, until a further communication in 197554 specified the 
methods to be applied in HBsAG blood screening.  
Meanwhile, a first case of mass contamination from blood product had occurred. 
In 1974, a considerable number (estimates advanced by the press at the time indicated 
between 150 and 500 cases55) of users of Trilergan, an anti-allergenic drug, developed 
hepatitis B a few weeks after administration. The drug was produced by Crinos, an Italian 
pharmaceutical company, and contained gamma-globulin provided by an Italian blood 
derivatives producer, the Istituto Sieroterapico Milanese Serafino Belfanti, which in turn 
had imported the immunoglobulins from the American company Armour 
Pharmaceutical56.  
This first Italian episode of viral contamination through blood products, at that 
time, went almost unnoticed. Facts were presented as controversial by the press57. The 
Health Ministry, in charge of ordering the immediate seizure of the drug when the first 
cases were reported, did not act promptly: the seizure was ordered only eight months after 
the marketing of the drug. No accurate administrative inquiry was ever conducted to 
determine what had gone wrong in the institutional control system then in place to 
preserve the viral purity of blood products.  
After all, in the mid ’70s the risk of viral contamination from blood products could 
likely be considered an inevitable inconvenience, a possible occurrence58. Consequences 
of hepatitis were deemed serious, but still acceptable if compared to the great therapeutic 
potential of blood products derived from large pools of donors. Not surprisingly, the 
Trilergan case rapidly sank from the press headlines into oblivion.  
                                                          
53 Health Ministry Circolare 30 June 1971, n.1188. One should be aware that a Circolare is not 
legally binding per se. Conceived to be an internal communication between superior and inferior 
administrative bodies, a Circolare may express an order, which applies only to the administrative office at 
which it is effectively directed and not to third parties. This explains why the publication of a Circolare in 
the Italian Legal Bulletin is not made compulsory by law. The very same feature suggests that, in terms of 
rule-making, a Circolare is not the most suitable legal vehicle for ensuring uniform and prompt 
implementation of mandatory measures, especially when these are addressed to a host of health facilities 
located throughout the country and embedded in a highly hierarchized administrative system.  
54 Health Ministry Circolare 9 December 1975, n.99. 
55 P.GUZZETTI, E il controllo? Dopo [Controls when? Afterwards], in Panorama 16 October 1975. 
56 For a medical discussion of the Trilergan case see F.L.PETRILLI ET AL., Hepatitis B in subjects 
treated with a drug containing immunoglobulins, in The journal of infectious diseases, 1977, 2:95.  
57 CDS 24 April 1975. 
58 P.M.MANNUCCI ET AL., Asymptomatic liver disease in hemophiliacs, in J.clin.Path., 1975, 
28,620.  
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The task of shedding light on what had occurred rested on the courts after that 
several lawsuits had been brought against Crinos, the final distributor of the drug, 
between 1975 and 1978. From a legal point of view, as we shall see when examining the 
pending controversies aroused by the HIV blood contamination, the Trilergan litigation 
established crucial juridical principles, holding legally accountable both the Italian 
pharmaceutical companies and the American supplier of the hepatitis-tainted 
gammaglobulins.  
From the policy-makers point of view, however, a prompt analysis of the 1974 
events should have made it clear to the Italian Health Authorities that the existing controls 
prescribed for blood products safety were merely formalities. The Trilergan affair clearly 
pointed out this deficiency with specific regard to imported raw blood components. 
The records of the legal proceedings many years later revealed that, although the 
Italian importer had followed the ministerial prescriptions then in force, the American 
gamma-globulin had proved to be infected. It was further revealed that, concerning their 
HBsAg testing, the Italian importer had duly relied on the FDA certification produced by 
Armour pharmaceuticals.  
These findings should have been a call for a careful review of the entire control 
system in force at that time to ensure the viral safety of blood products. Future regulations 
should have been conceived in order to guarantee that each batch of blood derivatives was 
effectively tested. But nobody at the time realized the importance of modifying the 
“philosophy” of the regulations on blood products safety. 
Three years after the Trilergan mass contamination case, the Health Ministry 
finally drew its conclusions. Once again, as proof that the problem of viral safety of blood 
products was still regarded as secondary by the supervising public authority, the measures 
to be enacted were issued by means of a Circolare59. Transfusion centers and 
pharmaceutical industries were required to test each single blood donation (regardless of 
its therapeutic use) for HBsAg by means of a third generation method, discarding blood 
tested positive.  
It was also imposed that long-preservation blood derivatives should be 
manufactured only from tested blood, and that each batch of final blood products had to 
be re-tested. Authorization for the marketing of the products would be issued only upon 
communication of these results to the Health Ministry. Records of these had to be kept by 
the importing company in order to ensure future documentation of the tests performed. 
Moreover, importation of blood products was to be permitted only from countries whose 
legislation ensured the same level of safety as in Italy. The importing companies were 
required to certify this condition not only by obtaining a formal declaration from the 
exporting country’s Health Authority, but also by attaching copy of the blood safety 
regulations enforced in the exporting foreign country.  
These provisions, although late in coming, could be considered effective in 
combating the risk of hepatitis B contamination of the Italian supply of blood products. 
Furthermore, looking beyond hepatitis, their severe rationale could have been applied in 
the future to new viral agents. Instead they were conceived in order to apply solely to the 
case of hepatitis B.  
Had these regulations been issued with more foresight, and within a more flexible 
legal framework, the same regulatory pattern would have been readily available in the 
                                                          
59 Health Ministry Circolare 24 July 1978, n.68. 
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event a new virus was to become a source of safety concern. The tragic events of the 
following decade would confirm the lack of such a flexible, general regulatory scheme.  
Clearly, the approach followed by the Italian Health Ministry in dealing with 
blood viral safety during the ‘70s indicates that blood safety policy was still regarded as a 
by-product of bureaucracy rather than institutional decision-making. 
 
The Advent of HIV: The Years of Uncertainty (1982-84) 
In Italy, the first cases of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonis and Kaposi’s sarcoma 
were reported in 1982 among gay man returning from foreign countries. The first case 
officially classified as AIDS involved an intravenous drug user from Milan and occurred 
in the first semester of 1984; at the end of that semester a total of 10 cases had been 
reported in the country60.  
In the summer of 1983, a few months after the first scientific description of the 
HIV retrovirus (then referred to as LAV/ HLTV-III), the Italian Health Ministry informed 
the regional health authorities about the characteristics of the new disease, and instructed 
that any ascertained or even suspected case should be reported to the Istituto Superiore di 
Sanità (ISS), the Italian National Health Institute61. This first institutional sign of alert for 
the new disease suggested that its viral ethiology might be similar to that of hepatitis B. 
No mention, though, was made to the possibility that HIV could be transmitted by blood. 
In May 1983, a periodical newsletter by the ISS had already published an 
informative article on AIDS. It reported the American data on AIDS in hemophiliac 
patients and focused on the causal link between the use of commercial AFC made from 
large pools of donors and the disease. The article clearly stressed that recipients of 
cryoprecipitates faced a lower risk of viral contamination, due to the fact that these blood 
products were obtained from small pools of donors62.  
In June, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe met in Strasbourg in 
order to adopt a common resolution addressed to prevent AIDS transmission from 
infected blood donors. The Italian Health Ministry was institutionally represented. Its 
representatives participated in the drafting of the European Recommendation, which, 
although not legally binding for the member states, openly spoke of the serious risk of 
AIDS contamination to which blood and blood product recipients were exposed. The 
institutional caveat addressed on June 24, 1983 to the national health authorities of the 
member-states could not be more straightforward: 
“to avoid wherever possible the use of coagulation factor products prepared 
from large plasma pools: this is especially important for those countries where 
self-sufficiency in the production of such products has not yet been achieved;  
to inform attending physicians and selected recipients, such as hemophiliacs, 
of the potential health hazards of hemoteraphy and the possibilities of 
minimizing these risks;  
to provide all blood donors with information on the Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome so that those in risk groups will refrain from donating 
(an example of an information leaflet for donors is appended); to pursue rapid 
                                                          
60 G.REZZA, Epidemiologia dell’AIDS in Italia, in Il libro italiano dell’AIDS, Milan, 1994, 3. 
61 Health Ministry Circolare 3 August 1983 n.64; see I.SERAFIN, La normativa italiana sull’AIDS, 
ibid., 11. 
62 ISIS, Medicina nel mondo 19/83, n.19, 14 May 1983, 11-12. 
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and full implementation of recommendations No. R (80) 5 and No. R (81) 
14.”63.  
 A research through the Italian legal bulletin leads to the paradoxical discovery 
that, in that same June of 1983, the Health Ministry went to the length of issuing detailed 
regulations for the production, trade and use of cow and pig plasma proteins64. It is not 
less paradoxical to note that Italy remains today one of the few countries among the 
industrialized nations where an “official history” of HIV blood contamination has not 
been compiled by a government commission. Accordingly, why the Italian Health 
Ministry bureaucracy ignored the European Recommendation when the first institutional 
information about the disease was released in August 1983 remains a mystery to this 
day65. Although the text of the recommendation was promptly translated and published by 
an Italian specialized journal for blood transfusion physicians66, the significance and the 
magnitude of the warning would have been clearly different if it had been institutionally 
endorsed in an official communication of the Health Ministry.  
Back in 1983, the conclusions reached the previous year at the Focus Panel on 
blood and plasma national adequacy67 had brought the Health ministry to appoint a 
commission of experts in charge of elaborating a five-year national blood plan. In 
December, this plan was on the desk of the Health Minister. The final report to be spread 
among blood system operators contained the statement “(B)lood transfusion may transmit 
diseases (Hepatitis, AIDS)” 68. But, once again, this concept languished in the ministerial 
in-tray, following the destiny of the national blood plan, which was never enacted.  
A year had silently elapsed from the first institutional information about HIV in 
August 1983, before the Ministry issued a second host of recommendations addressed, 
this time, specifically to health care workers. Further to a first set of measures to control 
the spread of AIDS among intravenous drug users and instructions concerning the 
epidemiological surveillance of the disease, the Ministry clearly stressed the risk of HIV 
transmission by accidental blood contact with patients.  
For some strange reason, the prophylactic guidelines (freshly issued at that time) 
by WHO in order to prevent this type of risk were in this case promptly followed by the 
bureaucrats of the Italian Health Ministry69. And yet, as for the Strasbourg 
                                                          
63 23 June 1983: Ministries Committee of the European Council Recommendation n. R (83) 8, in 
Recueil International de Législation Sanitaire (hereinafter: RILS) 35.1, 1984, 54. Of the two 
recommendations mentioned in the text, the R (80) 5 (Ibid. 33.1, 1982, 18) recommended the 
implementation of plasmapheresis obtained from voluntary blood donations and spelled out the risk of viral 
infections from pools composed of plasma from different regions. It gave detailed instructions on the use of 
antihemophilic concentrates and recommended that member states should create national registers of 
coagulopatic subjects. Recommendation R (81) 14 (Ibid. 33.2, 1982, 277) dealt with the general prevention 
of infectious diseases transmitted by the trade in blood and blood products among countries, and urged 
member-states to consider the epidemiological situation of the country of origin when importing blood and 
blood products. 
64 See DM 9 June 1983 (in GU 25 June 1983, n.173). 
65 Sabotaging recommended solutions is seen as a possible outcome of the difficult interaction 
between members of a bureaucratic organization and external advisors, see the interesting analysis of 
H.S.BAUM, The invisible bureaucracy. The unconscious in organizational problem solving, New York - 
Oxford, 1987, 145. 
66 Il Servizio Trasfusionale, 12, 1983:4. 
67 First Focus Panel on the National Blood Plan, quoted above, sub note 3.  
68 Proposta di piano sangue quinquennale, Ministero della Sanità - Centro Studi, December 1983.  
69 Health Ministry Circolare 25 June 1984, n.48 and 25 August 1984, n.65 (in RILS, 37.3, 1986, 
582-3). 
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recommendations, one may infer that the international guidelines emanating from Geneva 
were not legally binding either for the Italian government.  
The preceding facts may allow for a first conclusion. When evaluating with 
hindsight the behavior of the Italian health institutions in the two years following the CDC 
report of July 1982, the risk of underrating the uncertainties of the time should be born in 
mind. Nevertheless, in this retrospective evaluation two behavioral profiles may be 
highlighted. Clearly, the uncertainty issue (accompanied by the then existing clash 
between opposing scientific, political and also productive opinions) should not be 
forgotten when laying blame on institutions for the belated introduction of 
countermeasures concerning surrogate testing, donors exclusion and use of heated AFC.  
But the “uncertainty” scapegoat cannot be raised as easily when one comes to the 
analysis of a second behavioral profile: the role played by institutional decision-makers in 
spreading information about the existence of a risk within the blood system and among its 
operators70. With reference to this lack of information, the failure of the Italian Health 
Ministry appears striking in retrospect.  
In the absence of institutional action, information was a scarce resource, left to 
scientific initiatives like the one that an Austrian AFC producer undertook in March 1983, 
through a note published in a newsletter periodically sent home to Italian hemophiliacs:  
 
“...Since the MMWR report of July 1982, less then 10 cases of AIDS in 
hemophiliacs have been described in USA. The correlation lets us suppose 
that the pathology may be transmitted not only via homosexual intercourse, or 
via intravenous drug use, but also via blood. Homosexuals are a significant 
share of the plasmapheresis donors in the big American cities. Infected plasma 
from these donors may therefore contaminate the pool from which AFC are 
obtained. Among the several proposals made in order to reduce the risk of 
transmitting this mysterious virus, there is donor exclusion of groups at risk 
and the possibility to have as soon as possible AFC treated against blood 
transmissible viruses. Moreover, medical literature (quoting: Hemophilia 
Foundation passes AIDS resolution, in News briefs, November/December 
1982 Vol.5 n.11; H.STRAWCZYNSKY, Aids: a report, in Hemophilia today, 
January 1983, Vol. 20 n.1) is unanimous in suggesting no modification to the 
current therapeutic protocols for hemophiliacs, given the very low AIDS 
incidence among these patients and the hemorrhagic risks which would be 
increased by an insufficient substitutive therapy. It is important to stress that 
concentrates distributed by Immuno in Europe are exclusively manufactured 
in European Plasmapheresis Centers; plasma collected at Immuno’s 
Plasmapheresis Centers in the USA is fractionated and distributed only in the 
USA. At any rate, we believe it proper to disclose that Immuno, in its constant 
commitment to research, has developed an original method (not based on UV 
radiation or heat treatment) for the production of concentrates free from 
contaminating viruses; batches treated with this method are already being 
marketed.”71  
                                                          
70 “It is very much in the spirit of cultural theory to threat the institutions themselves as the 
monitors which determine what is going to count as information”, M.DOUGLAS, Risk and blame, quoted 
above, 18-19.  
71 Medical-scientific Direction of Immuno, La sindrome da immunodeficienza acquisita -- dalla 
Immuno S.p.a., in Ex, n.3 March 1983). 
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 Added to this “dynamism” of pharmaceutical companies in spreading information 
about the new “American” disease72, an Italian research group published at the beginning 
of 1984 one of the first scientific articles in medical literature to evaluate in hemophiliac 
patients the association between abnormalities of lymphocyte subset and the quantity of 
annual consumption of AFC derived from American plasma73. This article concluded: 
 
“(A)bnormal lymphocyte subpopulations per se cannot yet be used for 
diagnostic evidence of AIDS or its prodrome; only by longitudinal studies of 
asymptomatic hemophiliacs with abnormal values can the relevance of such 
tests to AIDS risk be established. Therefore, we cannot recommend using less 
than 20,000 U/yr. in an attempt to prevent AIDS solely on the basis of these 
data. We continue our present policy of giving all the factor they need, on 
demand, for treatment of hemorrhages and elective surgery. However, we 
avoid long term prophylaxis in an attempt to prevent all hemorrhage because 
there is no proof that such prophylaxis results in better prevention of 
hemophiliac arthropathy, while it does result in much larger concentrate 
consumption.”74
 
In the course of 1984 the Italian scientific community organized several 
international conferences in order to follow the evolution of scientific knowledge about 
AIDS. In May, Luis Aledort presented a report on “AIDS, hemophilia, blood transfusions 
and blood derivatives” at an international conference on AIDS held in Sardinia75; in 
October, at an international symposium held in Milan76, Bruce Evatt of the CDC reported 
about the situation in USA, whereas Adrian Bloom from Cardiff University spoke about 
“AIDS in hemophiliacs in Europe”.  
The antennae were up and something was about to happen.  
                                                          
72 Many years later, H.J.Eibl, Director of Immuno, when interviewed regarding the relationship 
between high incidences of HIV infection among hemophiliacs and the degree of import from the USA in 
the early eighties, will explain: “Nobody knew anything about the HIV infections in the late seventies and 
early eighties. So this contamination could not be avoided. It is true that in countries like Finland with 
almost no import of plasma products the incidence of HIV infection among hemophiliacs was low. On the 
other hand, countries like France and Switzerland had a high incidence, in spite of the fact that they 
imported almost no American products. So it is the epidemiological situation of a country which explains 
the incidence of HIV infection more than the degree of self-sufficiency. You cannot blame industry for not 
reacting in time. Within two years, we had techniques to screen donors and methods to inactivate the virus. 
Seldom have innovations been carried out so fast.”. In P.J.HAGEN, Blood transfusion in Europe: a white 
paper, Strasbourg, 1993, 26. 
73 P.M.MANNUCCI ET AL., Abnormalities of Lymphocyte subset are correlated with concentrate 
consumption in asymptomatic Italian hemophiliacs treated with concentrates made from American plasma, 
in Am.J.Hemat. 17:167 (1984). 
74 Ibid., 175. On how scientists take decisions in a bounded rationality setting and on the dominant 
role of the decision-maker’s values and interests in the final choice, R.N.GIERE, Spiegare la scienza, 
Bologna, 1996, 257 ss. [id., Explaining science. A cognitive approach., Chicago - London, 1988].  
75 International meeting on causes, pathogenesis, management and treatment of AIDS and related 
conditions, held in Cagliari, 1-3 May 1984. Curiously, the cover of the conference’s leaflet presented a 
world globe showing only two islands, Haiti and Sardinia, linked by a red line.  
76 AIDS: research status and epidemiology, fifth annual conference of the IHF’s Medical Scientific 
Committee, held in Milan, 1-2 October 1984. 
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Information Vs. Risk Perception  
At the end of 1984 the Italian health authorities had still not taken an official 
position toward blood safety from HIV: neither from an informative point of view, nor in 
a practical way, through the exclusion of donors at risk. Unobserved, the first decree 
authorizing the marketing of a dry-heated factor VIII concentrate produced by Immuno 
appeared in the legal bulletin in December 1984. Other brands this authorization within 
March 1985, whereas for three brands that marketed heated factor IX, authorizations were 
released, respectively, at the end of March, in April and December 1985.  
Yet, this bureaucratic clearance still lacked institutional action addressed to 
facilitate the distribution and consumption of these safer AFC among Italian 
hemophiliacs. The price of these new pharmaceutical specialties far outweighed that of 
the untreated ones (on average the former product cost five times more). Switching to the 
new product not only entailed a financial burden for hospitals and pharmacy 
administrators, but the temptation to liquidate the left over stock could be predicted. Not 
to mention that hemophiliacs living far from health facilities had the habit of storing large 
personal supplies of AFC in their home refrigerators. Prompt and precise information 
became crucial, given the ongoing lack of a legal ban on untreated concentrates. In this 
context, hemophiliacs could only rely upon themselves.  
In March 1985, members of IHF received in their mailbox the therapeutic 
handbook edited periodically by the Scientific Committee of the Fondazione. The 
handbook expressed concern over the first dramatic findings in the United States. It 
stated, however, that the HIV retrovirus rarely developed into full-blown AIDS. The data 
sought to minimize the fear:  
 
“(O)nly one hemophiliac in 1,000/2,000 has full-blown AIDS in the USA and 
other European countries; on the other hand, cases among non-hemophiliacs 
in Italy amount to no more than 20/30, as compared with 200/300 in other 
European countries similar in size to Italy, like England, France and Germany. 
It would seem, then, that the Italian hemophiliac has greater defensive powers 
and it is to be hoped that this tendency will be confirmed!”.  
 
To the question “(W)hat can the hemophiliac do to protect himself from AIDS?” the 
handbook answered:  
 
“[The hemophiliac] may, or will soon be able to, screen his/her serum for 
LAV/HTLV III by means of commercial kits that will be available in a few 
months time and are already available in some Centers. It must be recognized, 
however, that it is still not clear whether the presence of antibodies, detected 
in about half of the hemophiliac treated with more than 20.000 I.U. in our 
Center, signals the actual presence of the virus in the blood or whether it is 
rather a sign of a remote contact or, maybe, protection...”.  
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To the question “(W)hat are ‘treated’ concentrates?”, the pamphlet reported that the first 
results obtained using dry-heat or high-pressure methods to inactivate the AIDS retrovirus 
were very encouraging77. It ended:  
“(O)n the basis of this data we can give a set of important messages to the 
Italian hemophiliac: AIDS has still not appeared in Italy; the risk of new 
concentrates is lower than old ones, or may be even nil. Therefore there is no 
reason to abandon, reduce or, at any rate, change the treatment programs and 
the concentrate dosages that have proved able to transform the hemophiliac 
condition from a state of dependence and permanent frustration to a condition 
of autonomy and free expression of individual capacity”78.  
 
In that spring, the same message appeared again in the IHF newsletter, this time with a 
firm reprimand against the “unjustified alarm” provoked in the hemophilia community by 
the news about the presumed case of a hemophiliac, who turned out not to have AIDS79.  
 The Abbot test for HIV was approved by the FDA in March, and the use of the kit 
was authorized by the Italian Health Ministry the following month. At the end of May, 
IHF organized a press conference in Milan. The imminent wholesale availability of the 
Elisa test was announced and hemophiliacs were publicly invited to use only dry-heat 
treated AFC, those labeled with a green stripe on the packet as the executive secretary of 
IHF specified. At the same time Mannucci, director of the Scientific Committee of IHF, 
restated that the dimension of the contamination monitored at the time among the Italian 
bleeding disorder community was small. Again, emphasis was put on the impression that 
AIDS incidence in Italy was low when compared to other countries and that, for those 
hemophiliacs who had tested positive to HTLV IIII antibodies, the contact with the virus 
was not a death sentence, since only one out of 1000 or 2000 of those positive 
hemophiliacs had developed full blown AIDS in the USA80.  
 With hindsight this message reveals its spirit: warning and reassuring, inviting 
hemophiliacs to undergo a closer follow-up of their antibody status and stating that the 
test positive results did not mean that the deadly disease would manifest itself. A picture 
of the uncertainty of the time, indeed, framed by an innermost desire to hold on to 
optimism, to not surrender. After fifteen years of relentless improvements in the treatment 
of hemophilia, it was hard to dismiss a well-rooted melioristic attitude. Spread on the eve 
of what was then viewed as the end of the risk’s state (the massive adoption of treated 
AFC), these declarations may appear today as a by-product of the “scientific magic”. That 
                                                          
77 P.M.MANNUCCI, L.MONTAGNIER ET AL., Absence of antibodies to AIDS virus in hemophiliacs 
treated with heat-treated factor VIII concentrate, in Lancet, 2 February 1985. 
78 All excerpts translated with emphasis in the original, see, Fondazione Italiana dell’Emofilia, 
Manualetto, n.8/scheda 2, February 1985. 
79 Rapporto annuale del comitato medico scientifico della Fondazione Italiana dell’Emofilia, in Tra 
noi, n.3, spring 1985. 
80 The conference had a vast echo in the press at the time: see S.GIACOMONI, Contro l’Aids arriva 
“Elisa” un nuovo test per le trasfusioni [Elisa arrives to fight AIDS, a new transfusion test], in La 
Repubblica, 31 May 1985; P.MASTROLONARDO, Milano decide: test per i donatori [Milan decides: test for 
donors], in Il Secolo XIX, 31 May 1985; AIDS, Ricercatori milanesi: “immotivato il panico” [AIDS, Milan 
researchers: “unmotivated panic”], in Il Manifesto, 31 May 1985; Nuovi controlli nelle trasfusioni per 
limitare i rischi [New controls on transfusions to limit the risks], CDS 11 June 1985. 
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is, “[that attitude which] helps physicians to face problems of uncertainty, therapeutic 
limitation and meaning by ritualizing optimism ...” 81. 
 
Government Action 
Finally, on July 17, 1985, the Health Ministry issued the Circolare n.28, which 
(with the clarifications that will soon be given) can be considered the first legal source 
marking the introduction of basic precautions against the HIV contamination of blood and 
blood products in Italy. Under the label “survey and prophyilaxis of the LAV/HTLV III 
virus”, this ministerial communication provided for the testing of blood donors in order to 
detect the presence of the virus’s antibodies and recommended, according to the 
organizational capacities of each center, that the test be introduced as soon as possible, 
screening all donations. It also generally recommended that groups at risk should not be 
allowed to donate blood, although it did not suggest exclusion from donation for 
individuals only suspected of belonging to high-risk groups. The Circolare was also sent 
to pharmaceutical companies, stressing the need to use pasteurization in the production 
process. This communication, which never appeared in the legal bulletin and was not 
legally binding, did not impose, but only recommended. Nevertheless, at present in Italy 
July 17,1985 is often emphatically stressed as the date of operative enforcement of all 
necessary measures to reduce the risk of HIV-blood contamination.  
More realistically, tracing the chronology of regulatory action lay down by the 
Italian Health Authority in order to ensure the safety of blood supply and blood products 
from HIV, it must be recognized that a clear legal obligation in this sense was not issued 
until promulgation of the Decree-law April 29, 1987, 16682, as later specified by the 
Ministerial Decree January 15, 1988, n.1483. Prior to these dates, one only finds a 
                                                          
81 R.C.FOX, The human condition of health professionals, in Essays in medical sociology, 1988, 
New Jersey, 581. The author goes on: “(F)irst it is the tendency of medical pratictioners to favor 
demonstrably vigorous ways to treat patients, and their accentuate-the-positive inclination to be staunchly 
hopeful and tenaciously confident about the success of their active intervention - even when, and often 
especially when, a positive outcome is unlikely. Trying hard to “do something” effective about a serious 
medical problem can have a “self-fulfilling prophecy-like impact on health professionals, patients, and 
patients’ families alike. Particularly in an energetically melioristic culture like our own, with its “we shall 
overcome” outlook, it can encourage all concerned to endure, persist, and continue to believe, in ways that 
can contribute to the stabilization of a patient’s condition, to its improvement, and beyond that, to his or her 
recovery”.  
82 In GU 31 October 1987, n.255, later converted into Law 29 December 1987 (in case of 
emergency or necessity the Italian Government has the power to issue a Decree-law whose provisional 
measures go into effect immediately. If not converted into law by Parliament within 60 days, the Decree 
loses all effects and lapses. Frequently, the Government repeatedly re-issues the same Decree-law until 
agreement is finally reached with Parliament. This practice has become a standard in recent years, with 
perverse effects on the certainty of the legislation). It was established that the local health facilities had to 
ensure the HIV screening of all blood units collected, assigning only the units testing negative to direct 
transfusion or to blood and plasma derivatives production. The same mandatory procedure was prescribed 
for blood or blood derivatives imported from abroad. The promulgation of technical standards for testing (in 
this case extremely important) was postponed to a future ministerial decree. 
83 In GU 26 January 1988, n.20. All transfusion centers were mandatorily instructed to use 
anamnestic precautions for HIV in donor selection, excluding the group at risk (injecting drug users, male 
homosexuals, HIV positive partners, partners of subjects at risk, multi-transfused since 1978). The 
screening of all donors for HIV was also ordered, adopting a two-pronged test procedure based on methods, 
authorized in March 1987, by a previous ministerial decree. HIV analysis data had to be recorded in the 
transfusion center’s registers; these centers were obliged to periodically send a six-month report to the 
Health Ministry. Concerning blood product precautions, pharmaceutical companies authorized to produce 
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disparate set of ministerial communications and recommendations on diverse health 
policy aspects related to the new disease. These notes lacked coordination and, in some 
cases, were transmitted to regional health authorities by telegram84.  
If submitted to peer review, this patchwork of regulations depicts the image of 
fragmented institutional decision-making, stifled by bureaucracy. For instance, with 
regards to the implementation of treated AFC, the Italian Health Ministry recommended 
adoption of the dry-heat viral inactivation technique in the July 1985 Circolare. But it was 
only with the next communication of July 1986 that the Ministry mandatorily prescribed 
that all plasma products should be made from negative-testing single units of plasma, and 
that pools of production should be subjected to wet-heat treatment85. Scientific evidence, 
in fact, had clearly stated the greater safety ensured by this viral inactivation technique. 
One would have expected the Health Ministry to act accordingly. That is, to immediately 
order the withdrawal of all the stocks of concentrates which did not comply with this safer 
technique then in distribution or stored in hospitals. But this did not happen until the end 
of May 1988, when a series of ad hoc decrees suspended authorization to market dry-heat 
treated AFC86.  
According to these official dates, the Italian regulatory response to the risk of HIV 
contamination for blood and blood products does not reveal a farsighted approach when 
compared to other national experiences. On the contrary, a closer look brings to light the 
shortcomings displayed by bureaucratic rule-making, unable to enforce clear legal 
obligations in the blood system, when this was necessary to ensure the immediate 
implementation of vital countermeasures as, for instance, HIV screening of blood donors.  
This conclusion is confirmed when reviewing the initiatives taken by some 
regions, which, without awaiting the government’s mandatory instructions, immediately 
acted upon the July 16, 1985 “recommendation”. Lombardy, the Italian region most 
concerned with AIDS because it had the highest rate of cases, banned distribution and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
or import plasma or blood derivatives were instructed to use only blood or plasma previously tested for HIV 
and resulting negative in the manufacturing process, specifying that foreign companies must certify that 
tests had been carried out with methods authorized by the foreign country’s Health Authorities. A viral 
inactivation method previously authorized by the Health Ministry was to be applied to AFC. The technical 
directors of pharmaceutical companies had to certify that each batch of products had been individually 
tested for HIV, and that they were available to exhibit the relative certification upon request. 
84 Compare the set of communications that Veneto Region health authorities received from the 
Health Ministry which are listed in the Veneto Region Note 28 August 1986 “HIV infection -- Surveillance 
and prophylaxis measures”. This regional communication shows how individual regional health authorities 
could, in some cases, be very efficient in informing their health facilities about the measures to be taken 
against AIDS. The note recommended that, even if no cases had so far been reported of HIV transmission 
through immunoglobulins, the discovery -- in some batches -- of specific antibodies suggested their use 
only in case of real necessity and in moderate quantities. To make the warning effective physicians were 
reminded of their potential civil and criminal liability in cases of haphazard prescription of 
immunoglobulins (but the rationale of the warning could be extended to transfusions and blood products).  
85 Health Ministry Circolare 16 July 1986, n. 47 (in RILS, 1986, 37:4, 843). 
86 See the set of decrees of 27 May 1988 (in GU 17 June 1988, n.141). In a note dated 2 June 1988, 
the by then Director of the Pharmaceutical Service of the Health Ministry, Duilio Poggiolini, stated that one 
of the withdrawn products lacked any heat treatment. The “clean hands” scandal of 1993 revealed that 
Poggiolini, who had been the head of the ministerial pharmaceutical department for 20 years, had 
accumulated a multi-million $ fortune divided among Swiss bank accounts and Picasso paintings as 
personal profits from corruption (see, Tesoro in quadri nelle case romane di Poggiolini [A treasure in 
paintings in the Roman mansions of Poggiolini], in L’Unità, 9 November 1993). Among the many penal 
proceedings against the former ministerial director, also pending is an investigation carried out by the 
Naples criminal prosecutor into the above mentioned facts. 
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administration of untreated AFC on July 31, 198587, and enacted a detailed set of 
mandatory measures concerning HIV blood testing the following November88. 
 
Body Counts: The “Numbers” of the Italian Contamination 
From 1985 onwards, epidemiological data began to clear the uncertainty. In 
discussing these data, of course, a distinction should be made between the different 
classes of subjects exposed to HIV contamination: hemophiliacs and transfusion 
recipients. 
A) As regards the former, it should be considered that, until 1988, Italy lacked a 
national, official census of the population with bleeding disorders. From the ‘70s to the 
early ‘80s, the number of Italian hemophiliacs could greatly vary, according to the source 
and the context in which the numbers were quoted. In some cases, as when in the early 
‘70s the number needed to draw political attention to the disease, the Italian bleeding 
disorder community was said to number up to 10.000 Italians. A few years later, more 
realistic estimates based on variable rates of incidence of the bleeding disorders among 
the general population reduced these figures to approximately 4000 subjects.  
Only in 1983 the IHF and the Milan hemophilia center began to carry out an 
accurate national survey, with the specific purpose of evaluating the prevalence and 
characteristics of HIV infection in Italian hemophiliacs. The other Italian centers were 
invited to provide data, according to the parameters set by the center promoting the 
initiative. The results of this survey (which were not complete, since not all the centers 
had furnished data) were officially published by ISS as the first national report on 
congenital bleeding disorders in 1988. Simultaneously, these data were presented by the 
survey’s authors to the international scientific community, comparing them to similar data 
reported in France and Germany.  
 
*
89 Surveyed   Hemophilia A Hemophilia B 
  AIDS 
cases 
HIV cases AIDS cases HIV cases AIDS cases HIV cases 
Germany 2,476 148 (6.0%) 1,172 (47.4%) 131 (6.1%) 1,024 (47.6%) 17 (5.2%) 148 (45.6%)
France 2,445 58 (2.4%) 1,038 (42.3%) 40 (1.9%) 903 (36.9%) 18 (4.6%) 136 (35.0%)
Italy 2,792 57 (2.0%) 637 (22.8%) 36 (2.2%) 476 (28.7%) 20 (6.4%) 138 (44.1%)
 
Without doubt, these data were comparatively striking: although it became clear 
that Italy had not been saved from the international tragedy (637 Italian hemophiliacs had 
been found HIV-positive), the global rate of contamination (22.8%) appeared far lower 
than the rates displayed by the two European countries object of the comparison. 
Regarding Germany, where patients were treated with the same American-plasma-derived 
AFC as in Italy, this difference was explained by the larger doses of factor VIII 
administered to German hemophiliacs in the early ‘80s, when most infections had 
                                                          
87 Another Northern region, Emilia-Romagna, did the same in September. 
88 Regional Plan for the fight against AIDS, 22 November 1985 (in Bull. Lombardy Region, n.3, 
1986).  
89 Table reported in A.GRINGERI, P.M.MANNUCCI ET AL., National survey of Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus infection in Italian hemophiliacs: 1983-1987, in La ricerca Clin. Lab. 18: 275-280 
(1988). The study also reported that the first cases of AIDS had occurred in 1984, when Pneumocystiis 
carinii pneumonia and Kaposi’s sarcoma were diagnosed in two patients with no risk factors other than 
hemophilia, even though -- in 1983 -- 14 patients had been diagnosed as ARC. 
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occurred (84,000 I.U./patient/yr. vs. 25,000 in Italy). Regarding France, where the 
average use of AFC had been slightly lower than in Italy (22,000 I.U./patient/yr.), the 
study reported that beyond the Alps AFC was produced from domestic plasma, without 
being able to provide further explanations (but, at the time, the French scandal had not yet 
erupted).  
Upon closer observation, though, this comparative analysis casts a doubt. The 
Italian number of patients surveyed and reported in the table comprised 650 subjects 
affected by von Willebrand disease and 171 classified as “others”90. German and French 
data instead referred only to patients with hemophilia A and B. In fact, while for these two 
countries the sum of the disaggregated data reporting HIV infection for different types of 
hemophilia corresponds to the total number reported in the first column of the table above, 
this is not true for Italy. The conclusion then appears to be that the compared data were 
not homogeneous. In order to avoid the danger of underestimation due to the disparity of 
sources, it seems then methodologically appropriate to make reference to data relating 
only to hemophiliacs (factor VIII and IX deficient).  
In assessing the Italian dimension of the hemophiliacs contamination, the source 
which is most likely to illustrate its real magnitude is the 1990 national survey of the 
bleeding disorder population. In fact, examination of more recent surveys would again 
entail the risk of underestimation, due to the progressive inclusion in these statistics of 
hemophiliac children born when the risk of contamination was definitively over (from 
1987 onwards). The 1990 survey counted a total number of 2839 hemophiliacs in 36 of 
the 39 Italian centers (2394 A and 445 B). Of those, 2388 (1993 A and 395 B) had been 
tested for HIV. 
 
  Hemophiliac (A+B) Hem. A (factor 
VIII) 
Hem. B (factor IX) 
Patients surveyed  2839 2394 445 
Tested for HIV 2388 1993 395 
HIV POSITIVE 719 533 186 
% of tested patients HIV 
positive 
30.10 26.75 47.08 
Source: Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Registro nazionale delle coagulopatie congenite in 
Italia. Rapporto 1990, Rome ,1991. 
 
Overall, including VWD and other’s patients, the 1990 survey registered a total of 768 
subjects with various bleeding disorders testing HIV positive. This number grew to 820 
three years later and has been at a standstill ever since91.  
Clearly, the data just presented state that the phenomenon of Italian contamination 
was still of lesser incidence compared to other industrialized nations. Was this a 
consequence of Italian “farsighted” measures taken during the years of contamination? 
According to our attempt at reconstructing the events, the answer should be definitely 
negative. One explanation for the lower Italian rate of contamination may be the “lucky” 
circumstance of a less intense average consumption of AFC. In fact, according to the data 
of the 1990 survey, the rate of contamination of severe (A+B) hemophiliacs (those 
                                                          
90 Ibid., 278. 
91 Istituto Superiore Sanità, Registro nazionale delle coagulopatie congenite in Italia. Rapporto 
1993, Rome, 1994. 
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seemingly treated with more than 40,000 I.U./yr.) rises to 40.07%, with a disaggregated 
rate of 36.8% for factor VIII and a striking 56.7% for factor IX recipients.  
This conclusion remains a possibility, however, since to date neither experts nor 
institutional inquires have attempted to explain this Italian epidemiological anomaly. 
Taking for granted that treatment protocols for factor VIII and factor IX deficiency were 
similar throughout the world, why had this abnormally higher level of contamination 
occurred among Italians affected by hemophilia B? Does one need to assume that the 
lucky factor of moderate consumption was valid only for factor VIII recipients? Were 
there significant differences due to the fact that factor IX AFC used in Italy was supplied 
only by certain specific pharmaceutical companies?  
Possibly, the search for truth in the saga of the Italian hemophiliac contamination 
had ended even before it began, when those involved acquired a relative sense of relief by 
comparing the Italian situation to that of other countries. This may explain why so far 
nobody in Italy has felt the political necessity to pierce the veil of fatalism dropped on the 
circumstances of hemophiliac contamination, by shedding light on the quantities and the 
commercial sources of the AFC consumed in the first half of the ‘80s by Italian 
hemophiliacs92. 
B) Data on the transfusion recipients’ contamination are far more difficult to 
deduce from official reports than those concerning hemophiliacs. Whereas it is quite 
simple to calculate national figures for transfusion-related AIDS cases from the general 
epidemiological tables drawn up trimestrally by ISS on the basis of the compulsory 
notification system93, the key data (i.e.: the number of recipients testing HIV positive) can 
only be estimated.  
 Indeed, the Health Ministry encountered organizational problems in carrying out a 
general and systematic “look-back” program for transfusion recipients at risk of HIV 
contamination in Italy94. Such a program, based on the data on HIV cases obtained by 
means of the mandatory notification system, would have ascertained whether subjects 
detected as HIV positive had donated blood and, if so, it would have identified the (still 
unaware) recipients.  
Instead, more limited look-back programs had been conducted by ISS starting 
from transfusion-related AIDS cases signaled by the general notification system, with the 
twofold aim of identifying donors who unconsciously had transmitted the virus, and, 
eventually, identifying recipients of infected blood from these donors. But the main goal 
of these programs was to better classify donors at risk so that more precise data could be 
made available for medical interviews aimed to reduce the window period risk95. 
                                                          
92 And yet the recent Italian parliamentary history shows how frequently special parliamentary 
commissions have been appointed to shed light on a various set of events which have marked Italian 
political affairs in the last twenty years. 
93 In Italy the systematic collection of data concerning AIDS cases began in 1982, and was 
institutionalized in 1984. Starting from 1986, notification of new cases is made compulsory by law. 
Whereas AIDS cases must be nationally reported to ISS in Rome, the system of notification prescribes that 
HIV cases must be signaled to the regional health authority. Both the notifications, though not anonymous, 
are carried on so as to guarantee the non-disclosure of the data, V.FINESCHI, Segretezza professionale e 
deontologia medica, in P.CATTORINI, AIDS e bioetica, Milan, 1992, 51. 
94 DE STASIO, quoted above, 307. 
95 R.ARCIERI ET AL., Programma italiano di look-back per l’infezione HIV da emotrasfusione, in 
TS, 39:6 (1994) 479-84. 
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Therefore, while the total number of Italian transfusion recipients who developed 
AIDS stands at 381, as of 30 September 199696, official figures for HIV-contaminated 
blood recipients are not available. An internal communication of the ISS dated July 1993 
reported a provisional estimate of 700 cases97, but the real number may likely be double. 
 
Victims’ Awareness: How to Perceive a Iatrogenic Defeat?  
The risks posed to blood and blood product recipients by what the media initially 
presented as the gay and intravenous drug user plague went largely unobserved by public 
opinion. Despite the fact that the Italian media approach to AIDS in the first decade of the 
epidemic was described as an “informative overdose”98, the sensationalism and hype 
about the “plague of the year 2000” left the issue of blood safety substantially untouched 
by the media until 1985. In November of that year, one of the leading Italian weekly 
newsmagazines focused on the problem of implementation of the Elisa testing. It 
denounced the belated supply of the Elisa test kits to a transfusion center specialized in 
the treatment of thalassemic children in Sardinia99.  
The first article, however, to attach institutional blame to the HIV-tainted blood 
issue appeared in September 1986. It paid particular attention to the risk of HIV-infected 
immunoglobulins, and emphasized the threat raised by the American “dirty” plasma, 
stressing that American pharmaceutical companies allegedly used plasma from paid 
suppliers, recruited in South America, the Caribbean countries and ghettoes of the big 
American cities. The article denounced the great delay of the Italian Government in 
issuing a national blood plan, which, if implemented in time, would have permitted Italy 
to be self-sufficient, and to reduce the risk of contamination100.  
What happened in the hemophiliac community when those who were gradually 
discovering that they tested HIV positive, began to realize what this condition implied? 
Until 1985, they had received constant reassurances about the low proportion of Italian 
contamination and the neutral consequences of the presence of HIV antibodies in their 
blood. Still in that same year, the standard test report on the positive results of the HIV 
test contained the following statement:  
“POSITIVE. This does not absolutely imply that the patient will 
develop AIDS, but that he/she will face this eventuality in about 10% of the 
cases, according to current knowledge. It is recommended to repeat this test 
every 6 months and to consult a physician at the occurrence of the following 
symptoms (...)”101. 
                                                          
96 ISS, Aggiornamento dei casi di AIDS notificati in Italia al 30 settembre 1996, Rome, 9:12 
(1996).  
97 Letter of 7.29.93 by N.Schianaia from ISS (source: Italian Multi-transfused Association).  
98 This expression sums up the conclusions of a statistical survey on three leading Italian weekly 
newsmagazines, see M.BACCI, G.BENUCCI, Percezione dell’AIDS e mass-media: indagine sulle 
caratteristiche dell’informazione attraverso un’analisi della stampa settimanale, in Rassegna italiana di 
criminologia, 1993, 409. 
99 S.BOERI, Questione di sangue [Matter of blood], in Panorama 24 November 1985, 234. 
100 A.BELTRAMINI, G.MILANO, Se il sangue è sporco [If blood is dirty], Panorama 28 September 
1986, 246. 
101 This example of HIV test report was published on a hemophiliac newsletter, Ex, 12:8, August 
1985. 
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In the course of 1987, the hemophiliac newsletter began to collect obituary notices. 
Beside anonymous letters announcing the death of a member of the community, the paper 
published in June 1987 the news of the death of Frank Schnabel, the heroic President of 
the World Federation of Hemophilia102. The awareness of having been exposed to a fatal 
contamination produced an implosion in the hemophiliacs’ willingness to further trust the 
voice of the scientific experts, which earlier had managed to change their life 
prospectives. Only by lending an ear to personal testimonies can one capture the sense of 
betrayal that was being felt within the bleeding disorder community.  
The individual reactions to the tragedy overwhelmed the “sense of the community” 
that hemophiliacs had slowly achieved in fifteen years of successful action. Mixed 
feelings of rage and hope coexisted in those who had been diagnosed HIV positive. The 
desire of being left in peace prevailed in those who had avoided the disease, as if for them 
the idea of being part of the community had become synonymous with the fear they had 
lived in and which they no longer wanted to face. 
Very soon these conflicting responses to the contamination at an individual level 
would be dramatically echoed in the associative dynamics of the Italian hemophiliac 
community. 
 
The Rise of the Compensation Issue and the Hemophiliac Community 
Breakdown  
Until 1987, indeed, the IHF and its network of provincial and regional associations 
throughout Italy were still united in the common task of representing class interests. For 
instance, beginning in 1985, the IHF pressed regional health authorities to obtain separate 
hospital care for hemophiliacs with full blown AIDS from other terminally ill patients. 
Some regions, like Lombardy103, released the necessary financial support on the basis of 
the clinical specificity of the hemophiliac-with-AIDS care104.  
The news of the first compensatory claims raised by hemophiliacs in foreign 
countries as consequence of the contamination began to circulate among Italian 
hemophiliacs in 1987105. The community was bewildered. Most of its members had never 
experienced activism. They had been constantly informed by the IHF bulletin, had paid 
annual dues, were possibly part of local associations. But the representational strategies 
with politicians and public institutions106, until then, had always been a prerogative of the 
executive committee of IHF. Protected by the legal rules of the Fondazione, the IHF’s 
leadership had never changed since the establishment of the organization.  
                                                          
102 Ex, 14:7, July 1987, 4. 
103 Second regional plan for the fight against AIDS, in Bulletin of the Lombardy region 1 June 
1988). 
104 To a certain extent, this “separate hospital housing” issue may raise the idea that hemophiliacs 
were willing to obtain a tangible acknowledgment of their condition of “different victim” from the stigma 
associated to the “I-have-been-looking-for-it” categories of AIDS patients (namely, intravenous drug users 
and gay people). Interviewed, the IHF executive secretary denied this interpretation, pointing out that the 
structural inadequacy of the Institutes for infectious diseases in the Italian hospitals at the time was such to 
justify the hemophiliacs’ claim of being treated at the Hemophiliac Centers by their “familiar” medical staff.  
105 Compare, for instance, Ex, 14:7, July 1987, 6, reporting the news that British hemophiliacs had 
been invited to sue pharmaceutical companies responsible for the distribution of tainted-AFC.  
106 D.KIRP, The politics of blood: social movement mobilization in the AIDS crisis, in BAYER and 
FELDMAN.  
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In this context, it became crucial to devise a common strategy to support the plea 
for compensation. According to the IHF leadership, any action to be pursued, be it in 
court or in the political arena, had to take into account the need for safeguarding the 
privacy of the HIV positive hemophiliac. The public stigma associated with AIDS was the 
primary concern for the majority of the victims of contamination107. The general AIDS 
Act of 1990 had still to come108, and the perspective of being exposed to discrimination, 
once the identity of the plaintiff had appeared on the record of a lawsuit, prevented many 
of them from acting. Accordingly, IHF was in favor of establishing a dialogue with 
institutions, seeking political contacts to support the hemophiliac claim in Parliament.  
Angelo Magrini, President of the Piedmont Hemophiliacs Association based in 
Turin, was not convinced by the IHF’s line. For him it was time to react and, if necessary, 
to protest loudly. Any means could be used to shed light on the hemophiliacs’ tragedy and 
to rally public opinion. It was time to capture the individual rage of those who had been 
betrayed by blood. Along with hemophiliacs, many blood recipients lacking of any 
collective benchmark were facing the same drama in Italy. This common rage had to be 
conveyed in the struggle for compensation.  
This clash of strategies led in the summer of 1988 to the foundation of the 
Associazione dei Politrasfusi Italiani (Italian Multi-Transfused Association, hereinafter: 
API), which by choosing this name set out to represent the common interests of 
hemophiliacs and transfusion recipients, jointly affected by the unique life-and-death 
dichotomy of blood. There was a strategic intuition in the idea of setting up a common 
representational identity based on the drama of contamination, despite the vast differences 
existing between the two classes109. Clearly, this would have amplified the bargaining 
power with politicians and institutions, by presenting a larger “social bill” when pressing 
for compensation. The same card might have been played with the media, which in fact 
were to be extensively used by the API in the course of its action110.  
But, above all, this collective front could capture a key element in the by-standers’ 
perception of the HIV-tainted blood contamination. For a host of self-evident 
considerations, blood recipients, unlike hemophiliacs, were not (and could never have 
been) a class. Each individual, in the course of his/her life, is confronted with the 
prospective of becoming a blood recipient. A woman after a cesarean childbirth, a teen-
ager after a motorbike crash, any person undergoing a surgical operation. In the tragedy of 
HIV contaminated blood, blood recipients were the “every one of us”. The rhetoric of the 
“it-could-happen-to-anybody”, therefore, became available to the API’s representational 
action. It was to be used as a central element of the collective action both for the past (that 
is, the quest for compensation) and the future (the call for improved blood safety).  
                                                          
107 Interview at Umberto Randi, October 1995. 
108 Law 5 June 1990, n.135. Among a set of measures for the prevention and the fight against 
AIDS, this Act provided anti-discriminatory rules for individuals testing HIV-positive and introduced a 
specific prohibition for public disclosure of data concerning the seropositive status.  
109 Magrini’s intuition was shared by the Péron-Garfanoff brothers, who founded the French 
Association des Polytransfusés in 1989, M.STEFFAN, France, in BAYER and FELDMAN.  
110 In the course of a few years, the name and the face of Angelo Magrini, the API’s leader, became 
well-known to the public, due to his frequent appearance in talk shows and journalistic programs of Italian 
television. The media was attracted by the public exposure of the personal dramas which often accompanied 
his TV appearances. According to the API’s strategy, the emotional impact of personal stories of 
individuals who, challenging the AIDS stigma, were persuaded by Magrini to appear on TV was often used 
for the Association’s cause.  
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The Compensation Claim in the Italian Political Arena: The Battle of the Bill 
Proposalse 
To approach Parliament has never been difficult in Italy. Among the more than 
nine-hundred Italian Deputies and Senators elected every legislature, even the smaller 
local group of pressure does not encounter too many difficulties in finding an ear ready to 
transform the group’s particular interests in an ad hoc bill proposal111. As comparative 
analyses report, the volume of statutes introduced each year by the Italian law-makers 
finds no counterparts in the context of western democracies, with the notable exceptions 
of the US Congress and the Swedish Riksdag112. This fertility, though, is paid in terms of 
legislative quality of the proposed bills: the diminutive term leggine is commonly used in 
Italy to indicate the plethora of “by-laws statutes” resulting from this fragmented and 
narrow-aimed exercise of law-making. The great majority of these leggine never see the 
light on the legal bulletin113.  
In this respect, the role of the Italian political parties is critical. “...Inundated with 
thousands of private member bills, but (...) paralysed when faced with major 
programmatic legislation...”114, the Italian Parliament is not easy to go through for 
interested groups not willing to accept the necessary mediation of political parties. 
Therefore, for an interest group getting the personal political commitment of a single law-
maker or even of a group of parliamentarians may lead to little or no result in terms of 
successful legislative outcome115. Conversely, the chances of legislative success of a bill 
proposal increase considerably when this is promoted by the Executive116.  
In this context, IHF and API, joint but separate, begun to seek political contacts in 
the Roman corridors of Montecitorio and Palazzo Madama. The art of lobbying provides 
a long list of strategic steps to gain the law-makers’ attention117. Yet, the strategies 
selected by the two groups totally differed. The IHF relied on its well-rooted tradition of 
advocacy for the Italian hemophiliacs. To a certain extent, this “official” identity of the 
organization smoothed the path of IHF toward law-makers. This was not the case for the 
API, which needed to build up its representational role before the Parliament members.  
                                                          
111 For this prerogative of the Italian democracy, G.PRIDHAM, Parliamentarians and their 
constituents in Italy’s party democracy, in V.BOGDANOR, Representatives of the people? Parliamentarians 
and constituents in western democracies, Cambridge, 1985, 158; S.BARNES, Representation in Italy: 
institutional traditions and electoral choice, Chicago, 1977, 12.  
112 International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation, Parliament of the world: a comparative 
reference compendium, London, 1986, 909 ss. The US specificity is due to the fact that all bills are 
introduced by individual members of the Parliament regardless of whether or not the initiative derives from 
the executive.  
113 Just to give an idea of the Italian legislative output, 3618 private member bills were proposed in 
the House of Deputies during the 9th Italian legislature (1983-1987). Of those, only 385 effectively passed 
(this number encompasses also bills first presented in the Senate), P.FURLONG, Parliament in Italian politics, 
in P.NORTON, Parliament in western Europe, London - Portland, 1990, 64.  
114 In these terms, S.TARROW, Italy: crisis or transition?, in P.LANGE, S.TARROW, Italy in transition. 
Conflict and consensus, London, 1980, 178. 
115 G.PASQUINO, Istituzioni, partiti, lobbies, Rome - Bari, 1988, 99.  
116 For the dominant role of executive promoted legislation in the European democracies, 
E.C.PAGE, Burocrazia, amministrazione, politica, 1990, Bologna, 89 (originally id., Political authority and 
bureaucratic power. A comparative analysis, 1985, Brighton).  
117 C.MILLER, Lobbying government. Understanding and influencing the corridors of power, 
London, 1987. 
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Not surprisingly, the first narrative of “institutional blame” presented to public 
opinion to support the hemophiliac claim for compensation, appeared in an article 
published by La Stampa, the Turin newspaper with national diffusion, at the beginning of 
1989. It headed “AIDS, infected owing to the State’s negligence”118. Few months later, a 
leading Italian newsmagazine headed again “AIDS from the State”119, telling the sad story 
of Rocco Micò, the Italian “Ricky Ray” who died of AIDS in 1987 at the age of eleven. A 
few months later the same news magazine blew on the fire, reporting the news that 70% 
(!) of the Italian hemophiliacs had already been contaminated120. This press mobilization 
prepared the ground for the breakthrough of the hemophiliacs cause into the legislative 
arena which, in fact, followed a few months later.  
A first Bill proposal was presented in the Senate at the end of 1989121. The 
proponents were acting on behalf of the IHF. Accordingly, the draft envisaged a no-fault 
compensation scheme to recover only the damages suffered by hemophiliacs or other 
consumers of pharmaceutical products derived from blood. The political syllogism 
selected to support the initiative was based on the guilty delay of the Italian State122 in 
enacting the National Blood and Plasma Plan. If tempestively implemented, as the IHF 
had demanded since the ‘70s, the Plan would have made national self-sufficiency 
possible, avoiding import dependency and, therefore, HIV contamination of AFC 
recipients. Instead, the preamble continued, hemophiliacs had received AFC “...almost 
totally obtained from plasma of American mercenary donors”. This conclusion was 
reinforced by emphasizing that English factor IX deficient patients escaped contamination 
because in the UK these AFC were obtained wholly from national plasma. Further 
comparative references were made, albeit generically, to European countries which 
already compensated hemophiliacs, and to France, where, it was stated, the Health 
Ministry had already approved a compensatory bill that was about to be enacted.  
The introduction of the no-fault plan was also buoyed by specific legal 
considerations. The injured minority was presented as a class of forced consumers of 
State-guaranteed life-saving medicines, included in the National Drug List. In order to 
recover damages from pharmaceutical companies, it was pointed out, HIV-contaminated 
hemophiliacs could not rely on the newly enacted Product Liability Act of 1988, since this 
expressly barred action for products marketed before that date.  
Accordingly, the establishment of a State-financed fund administered by an ad hoc 
agency was seen as the only equitable solution. This latter was to act as a first-pay 
insurance for the injured and then, possibly, could set a recourse claim against 
pharmaceutical companies. In this way, HIV-contaminated hemophiliacs were to forego 
the hardships of a piecemeal litigation against pharmaceutical companies. The plaintiffs’ 
                                                          
118 AIDS, malati per colpa dello stato, in La Stampa, 15 February 1989. 
119 G.MILANO, AIDS di Stato, in Panorama 2 April 1989. 
120 G.MILANO, Solo sangue DOC [Only controlled denomination origin blood], ibid., 18 June 1989.  
121 Bill proposal n. 2019, 19 December 1989, Senators Corleone and others, in RIML., 1990, 991. 
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inconveniences in filing a tort lawsuit based on negligence against AFC producers were 
reviewed: to establish the evidence of the administration of one (rather than an another) 
give brand of AFC and of the precise timing administration; the high cost of legal fees123; 
the fear of undergoing a public trial; the possible diversity of the judicial outcome.  
Concretely, damages were to be awarded following the ordinary quantification 
applied after courts in personal injury claims. In case of death, the award could be made to 
the spouse, to the parents or to the son of the injured. A time-bar of ninety days from the 
filing of the administrative claim to the Fund was prescribed for the examination of the 
record, with an additional sixty-days time-bar for the payment of the awards. With the due 
differences, the legal architecture of the IHF Bill proposal was quite similar to that which 
was to be endorsed by the French compensation plan in 1991.  
Totally different in its philosophy, a new bill proposal followed in February 1990, 
this time presented in the House of Deputies on the API’s behalf124. The preamble 
referred to the State in terms of ‘unmindful’ or ‘insensitive’ and contained a vibrant 
indictment of the Italian blood system regulations, which the State had left unmodified for 
twenty years without deeming it necessary to adopt a national blood and plasma plan. The 
serious consequences were illustrated: Italy was still compelled to import more than 75% 
of its plasma needs, and the imported plasma was obtained from paid South American, 
African and Haitian donors. Also denounced was the Italian Health Authority delayed 
adoption of heat treatment and mandatory screening of every donation of plasma to be 
used for AFC, pointing out that these measures had been effectively implemented only 
starting from the 1986 Circolare .  
Upon this premise, the Bill’s policy was to take into account the protection of a 
vast array of individuals exposed to HIV contamination via bodily fluids: hemophiliacs, 
blood recipients, hemodialyzeds, organ transplant recipients. The aim was twofold: 
prevention for the future and compensation for the past. A National Commission for the 
assistance and protection of multi-transfused subjects was to be set up, its tasks being to 
set up measures to prevent the possible recurrence of new viral contamination, as well as 
to grant compensation for those who had been infected by HIV. Damages were to be 
awarded on a lump-sum basis: approximately $200,000, at the Commission’s fact finding 
on the administrative claim; a further $200.000, at the time of the claimant’s death, to be 
awarded to the spouse, the parents or the son of the injured .  
The API’s bill was presented again in the House of Deputies on July 1990, with 
some significant amendments125. The reference to organ transplant recipients and 
emodialyzed patients had disappeared, but, for the first time, the compensation proposed 
was extended also to HCV victims. The preamble did not mention considerations on 
State-budget constraints or on scientific evaluations of the incidence of the virus among 
multi-transfused to support this extension. Probably, the then fresh discovery of the 
causative virus of the NANB hepatitis was considered by the proponents just as a striking 
opportunity to add the issue to the legislative agenda126. 
                                                          
123 In the Italian legal system the contingency fee is banned and the “loser pays all” rule apply, see 
infra.  
124 Bill proposal n.4590, 16 February 1990, Deputies Massano and others, in RIML, 1991, 659. 
125 Bill proposal n.4928, 3 July 1990, Deputies Caria and others, in RIML, 1991, 670. 
126 J.A.CUTHBERT, Hepatitis C, Am J Med Sci 299 (5): 346-355 (1990); T.G.WREGHITT, Antibody 
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As mentioned before, at the time of presentation, the above proposals might have 
been judged naive or, rather, utopian by an impartial analyst of the dynamics of the Italian 
Parliament. Clearly, these proposals (and particularly the API’ ones) entailed an 
incalculable (yet, surely heavy) financial burden for the Treasury. Despite a flourishing 
welfare tradition127, the issue of compensating victims of iatrogenic diseases was 
completely new to the Italian political agenda. And it was also ideologically neutral. Law-
makers who accepted to support the different claims of the IHF and the API did not have a 
uniform political color. The signers of the Bills came from the left, the extreme right and 
the parties of the government coalition. Behind an issue with no political identity, there 
were citizens belonging to a well defined minority lobbying for a legislation which would 
benefit them personally. And Italians, Italian legislators at least, traditionally were likely 
to see in what in other democracies would have naturally been considered a “self-
interested democratic participation” a search for personal advantages, and, as such, 
politically unacceptable128.  
 
Stumbling into Favorable Legal Arguments: On How the Legal Process Can 
Ease a Political Struggle 
On June 22, 1990, the Italian Constitutional Court issued a landmark decision. In 
the Oprandi case the Court declared unconstitutional a 1966 Act imposing mandatory 
antipolio vaccination, because it did not provide just compensation for those injured as an 
accidental consequence of the inoculation129. In case risks inherent to the vaccination and 
not due to medical malpractice were to befall on the vaccine recipients130, the Court ruled 
that these latter should not bear the consequences of an act imposed in order to enhance 
public health. Oprandi held the State accountable for compensating such (no-fault) 
damages, arguing from Art. 32 of the Italian Constitution, which protects the health of 
each individual as a fundamental right. The opinion, though, framed the ruling in order to 
make it clear that this did not conceptually impinge in tort law. In this case, the State 
could not be deemed legally accountable for the breach of a duty of care. The deterrent 
function inherent to tort law was misplaced in a case in which the injury was the 
unavoidable consequence of a mandatory therapeutic treatment. It was a matter of “pure” 
compensation or, more precisely, of indemnification.  
Therefore, albeit not explicitly, the Court followed the logic applied in property 
rights takings, as if the health of the individual injured by the vaccination had undergone 
to a taking for public utility131. First, damages were to be quantified as if they had been 
                                                          
127 LAPALOMBARA, quoted above, 54. 
128 R.D.PUTNAM, The belief of politicians. Ideology, conflict and democracy in Britain and Italy, 
1973, New Haven-London, 228. 
129 Corte Costituzionale 22 June 1990, n.307, Foro.it, 1990, I, 2694.  
130 Ms. Oprandi, the plaintiff in the case decided by the Court, was the mother of a child inoculated 
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been inoculated.  
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 34
awarded in an ordinary personal injury claim, taking into account medical expenses, lost 
income and pain and suffering. Then, the award had to be equitably reduced, just in order 
to consider the lack of negligence on behalf of the State.  
For the first time, the legal process urged the Italian State to act as social insurer 
for a particular class of disabled people132. Clearly, the Constitutional Court’s ruling 
confronted the Parliament with the need to legislate on the issue, since the Court had 
made manifest that compensation for vaccination-related injuries could not be regarded as 
a matter of tort liability.  
Yet, the victims had received a vested cause of action which entitled them to 
obtain compensation from the State. A delay in adopting a compensation plan for those 
injured by vaccinations threatened financial disaster for the Treasury. The ruling of the 
Court, albeit not formally binding on Parliament, could open the way to lawsuits against 
the State to be filed by the many people in the same condition as Ms. Oprandi. Damage 
awards as large as the one she obtained in the remand judgment from the constitutional 
court ruling would have quashed the State budget133.  
With a remarkable sense of timing, three weeks after the Oprandi decision, a 
group of Deputies presented a Bill aimed to set up a general compensation plan for all the 
victims of diagnostic or therapeutic treatments, which was also to consider the 
compensation demanded by hemophiliacs and transfused patients134. This proposal was 
far more ambitious than the ones already examined: it had been drafted by expert jurists 
and sought to systematize the Oprandi ruling into the legal system.  
The preamble was itself a documented essay on the legal issues raised by the 
(increasingly delicate) relationship between health and medicine. It presented data on the 
spread of the contamination in Italy and quoted an estimate by the API that predicted 
more than 1,000 cases of HIV-tainted blood victims in the years to come. Data presented 
at the San Francisco International AIDS Conference in June 1990 on the global dimension 
of the hemophiliac contamination were described, as well as comparative data on 
successful compensation claims lodged by hemophiliacs in several industrialized nations, 
quoting the 1987 Danish Act, the 1989 French public and private solidarity Fund, the 
1976 German drug-producer liability Act, the English forms of welfare. The preamble 
pointed out that the risk of HIV transmission was also present in transplants and artificial 
insemination, and that hepatitis C infection was widespread among blood recipients. The 
still real window-period risk for blood transfusion recipient was mentioned to underline 
that there was the need for legislating for the future. Quoting the Oprandi ruling, it was 
remembered that the rules of tort liability of the Italian Civil Code were often unable to 
offer judicial redress to those injured by these new health threats. 
The core of the proposal was the concept of “biological wealth” of the individual. 
The legal foundations of this concept, the preamble explained, were to be found in the 
case-law implementation -- after a 1986 landmark by the Constitutional Court -- of the 
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132 G.PONZANELLI, Lesione da vaccino antipolio: che lo Stato paghi l’indennizzo!, in Foro.it, 1990, 
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See Tribunal of Milan 20 December 1990, in Foro.it, 1991, I, 1239. 
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RIML, 1991, 1017. 
 35
legal notion of “biological damage”. Under this notion, which was first developed by 
legal scholars in the ‘70s, the Italian jurisprudence had increased the award of damages in 
personal injury cases, assigning a per se value to the individual’s health, apart from the 
loss of earning capacities. With no intention to be precise from a comparative law 
standpoint, this concept granted to Italian courts the possibility to award damages that, in 
common law terms, would be classified as loss of enjoyment of life and loss of 
expectation of life. 
Arguing from a legal scholar perspective, the proposal envisaged: the 
establishment of a National Scientific Commission with the task to drawing up uniform 
criteria for the safety of therapeutic and diagnostic treatments and the quality of drugs, 
blood and other human materials, as well as for the safety of diagnostic and therapeutic 
equipment; a strong administrative decentralization of the blood system; an express 
provision that qualified blood as a product in order to make available the 1988 Product 
Liability Act to HIV-tainted-blood-related claims; the inclusion of the so-called 
“development risks” in the field of application of this Act; the establishment of a National 
Fund under the Health Ministry’s supervision, which, before the pharmaceutical 
companies liability could be legally ascertained, was to act as a first-pay insurance for the 
injured party on the condition that this latter had been treated at a public health facility or 
had been administered a drug included in the National Drug List. 
As early as 1990, the number of legislative proposals aimed, in various ways, to 
support the claim for compensation of hemophiliacs in Italy was probably higher than in 
any other industrialized nation. This is striking if one considers that, a part from a few 
press articles, the issue had caused very little mobilization in the general public. Nothing 
similar to the French affaire du sang contaminé had taken place in Italy. No backward 
analysis had been conducted on the causes and the circumstances of the contamination. 
Even the number of potential claimants, in case a compensation plan was to be enacted 
also for transfusion-related cases of contamination, was unknown.  
Still, the issue of compensation had been statutorily packaged, namely, it had been 
inserted into the agenda of the Italian legislative process. And, by undergoing this process 
of “statutorization”, the political claim had been enlarged. From “compensating only 
hemophiliacs”, to “compensating also blood recipients”, “compensate also HCV victims”, 
up to “compensating all the victims of therapeutic treatments”. This escalation had left 
unsolved the many issues which should be carefully evaluated before enacting a 
compensation plan for victims of iatrogenic diseases135. And, above all, the most trivial 
one, namely, how the plan was to be financed136. 
 The Claim for Compensation in the “Maelstrom” of the Italian Law-Making 
Process 
The story of the enactment of the Italian compensation plan reveals the secret 
dynamics of the Italian legislative process. This, metaphorically, may be aptly defined a 
“maelstrom”. The Government, in fact, ignored all the above examined bill proposals, and 
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preferentially over victims of other misfortunes, there will not be much gained from formulating detailed 
designs for schemes and benefits. The daunting lesson to be learned from a disease focus is that the 
“compensation” debate is fundamentally and disturbingly more complex than we have generally assumed”.  
136 A.R.KLEIN, A legislative alternative to “no cause” liability in blood product litigation, in 12 
Yale J. on Reg. 107, 115 (1995).  
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it also ignored the protests of both the IHF and the API until June 1991137. That June, the 
International AIDS Conference was to be held in Florence. The world media were to 
cover the event, along with thousands of AIDS activists from all over the world.  
It was probably not incidental that on June 16, 1991, four days before the 
opening of the Conference, the Health Minister Francesco De Lorenzo personally wrote a 
letter to the API President138. He gladly announced that the drafting process of the Bill 
which was to enact the compensation plan was at a satisfactory stage. The Minister assured 
his personal commitment. The Act had to be promulgated. A preliminary draft was attached 
to the letter to prove his good will. It envisaged a public-private solidarity fund with a 
financial contribution by pharmaceutical companies amounting to the 0.025 percent of their 
total revenue from the sale of drugs included in the National Drug List139. This contribution 
by the pharmaceutical companies was met positively by the leaders of the hemophiliac 
movement140. De Lorenzo, resolute, publicly confirmed his intention to maintain this 
policy141.  
Easy propaganda in view of the world’s media coverage of the Florence meetings? 
Fear of the (otherwise possible) noisy protests by hemophiliacs during the meeting142? 
Maybe both: the fact is that the draft presented in June 1991 by the Health Minister 
mysteriously changed when the Act finally came into force in February 1992. We shall 
never know if pharmaceutical companies would have wished to contribute to the 
compensation plan that had been promised by De Lorenzo, who, incidentally, will be 
politically swiped away by the “clean hands” scandal in 1993143.  
                                                          
137 These protests were reported by the press: see La denuncia e la speranza degli emofilici [The 
hemophiliacs’ denunciation and hope], in CDS, 26 March 1990; Milano, Colpiti nel sangue [Struck in the 
blood], in Panorama, 19 May 1991: public protests and denunciations of API and IHF increased after the 
eruption of the French blood scandal in 1991.  
138 The letter was published in the API bulletin: Emonews, September 1991, 3.  
139 “...(A) loss-based compensation system could not achieve precise and corrective justice and 
deterrence unless premiums (or taxes) financing the system were calibrated to responsibility for losses 
covered by the system and paid by potential injurers...”, K.S.ABRAHAM, L.LIEBMAN, Private insurance, 
social insurance, and tort reform: toward a new vision of compensation for illness and injury, 93 
Colum.L.R., 75, at 91 (1993).  
140 U.RANDI, Trattamenti obbligatori, trattamenti obbligati e indennizzi per i danni, in Diritti 
dell’uomo 3, 1991, 53. 
141 Id., Interview with the Health Minister Francesco De Lorenzo, ibid., 22.  
142 The Florence International Conference events illustrate the weakness of the level of political 
identity and organized action displayed by the Italian gay groups vis-à-vis AIDS issues. This can 
retrospectively explain why in the Italian HIV-tainted blood saga there is no trace of interaction or contrast 
between the gay and hemophiliac communities, as in other national experiences. When the gay 
communities, present in Florence, decided to march through the center of the city, the Italian group – 
supposed to lead the march – hesitated. The French, German and American groups started marching, using 
the “ACT UP!” international movement’s strongly politicized slogans: “Stop the profiteers”, “Act up, fight 
AIDS, fight back”, “Stop AIDS now”, “Doctor fascist, take out the new drugs from your trays”, etc. The 
Italian gays who participated in the march were unimpressed by the quarrelsome protests of the foreign 
groups. When, during the conference, the Deutsche AIDS Hilfe showed some video clips with explicit safe 
sex scenes, comments from the Italian gay community were inspired to criticism: “we don’t have to 
exaggerate, we don’t have to endanger our relationship with institutions”. The isolated initiatives of some 
“ACT UP!” militants from New York, Paris and the Netherlands during the conference, were seen with a 
mixture of distrust and aloof superiority by the Italian gay leaders. See, also for further information on the 
Italian gay community’s reaction to the AIDS epidemic, M.CONSOLI, La funzione dei gruppi sociali nella 
percezione della malattia, in Il libro italiano dell’AIDS, quoted above, 31.  
143 The former minister is currently undergoing a criminal trial, having been accused of extortion 
and corruption.  
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What the Neapolitan Minister had solemnly promised to the hemophiliac 
community, became, in its final version, nothing more than a badly amended variant of an 
old preliminary draft which had been prepared in 1986 by the Health Ministry, in 
coordination with other Ministries (Internal Affair, Justice, Treasury, and Defense) to 
compensate the vaccination-related injuries144. It had, until then, been locked up in the 
ministerial archives, provoking intervention by the Constitutional Court.  
As previously noted, the Oprandi ruling in 1990 had forced the Government to 
consider the issue of vaccination-related injuries, under pain of financial disaster for the 
Treasury. In the meantime, the hemophiliacs claim for compensation had been placed in 
the political agenda. This coexistence of legislative proposals to be urgently enacted 
resulted in a jumbled statutory text. Despite the fact that the legal, medical-statistic and 
economic foundation of a no-fault plan greatly differ according to the kind of personal 
injury that the plan is addressed to compensate145, the legal scheme of the Act that, 
eventually, endorsed the blood victims claim, was the one drafted in 1986 for vaccine-
related injuries, only slightly amended to consider new classes of claimants. 
The attempt to understand the reasons behind this cross-eyed legislative outcome 
leads to consider the hidden core of the Italian legislative process146. Before being 
enacted, statutory law in Italy is always subject to a lengthy process of approvals by the 
two legislative assemblies. The iterant game of amendments and correlative re-passing of 
the texts is time-consuming. Therefore, if a draft has been approved by, say, the House of 
Deputies, Senators face the amendment’s dilemma: to approve the statute as it is or to 
return it to their colleagues in Montecitorio. This may cost months of delay.  
In the hemophiliac compensation plan’s case, Parliamentary Reports state that 
Senators have encountered precisely this dilemma. In January 1992, the Senate Assembly, 
in the presence of the Health Minister147, voted so that the compensation plan designed 
for vaccine-related injuries absorbed the others bill proposals expressly drafted in order to 
compensate blood victims148. The former, in fact, had been already passed in the House of 
Deputies, and Senators were aware that there was no time left. That February, the 
mounting crisis of the government coalition was to send home the members of the 
Parliament, with the President of the Republic holding new elections. And this would 
have paralyzed the hemophiliacs hope for months.  
Even so, it was not easy for the plan to be definitively approved. The last 
parliamentary vote for the Act was held the day before the end of the tenth legislature of 
the Italian Republic. In Italy this is supposed to be a rush time for law-makers, when 
traditionally the legislative outcome increases proportionally to their acquired 
consciousness of having to deal with re-election campaigns. 
                                                          
144 Draft Bill n. 3730 presented to the House of Deputies and to the Senate on 7 May 1986, in 
RIML, 1986, 1243. 
145 For a general overview, S.A.M.MCLEAN, Compensation for damage. An international 
perspective, 1993, Dartmouth.  
146 Compare D.FARBER, P.P.FRICKEY, Law and the public choice. A critical introduction, 1991, 
Chicago - London, at 153: “...legislative outcomes may be the product of the legislature’s structure and 
procedures, rather than being any simple reflection of voter preferences.”.  
147 On January 21, 1992, the API’s leader wrote an open letter to De Lorenzo that was also sent to 
the Italian newspapers: it began “(W)e are fed up with promises, with bureaucratic delays, with the Health 
Minister”. 
148 Parliamentary reports, Senato della Repubblica, discussion of January 30, 1992.  
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On March 3, 1992, the Act 210/92 was published in the legal bulletin149.  
 
The Enactment of the Compensation Plan and its Legislative Stabilization  
The classes of injured parties entitled to claim compensation under this Act, reveal 
to have nothing to share but the fact of having been listed in a section of a statute. They 
are: a) whoever has been injured by mandatory vaccinations and suffer from permanent 
disabilities, as well as who suffers from permanent disabilities resulting from contact with 
these latter; b) recipients of HIV-tainted blood or blood products; c) post-transfusional 
hepatitis sufferers; d) health care workers contaminated by HIV as a result of workplace 
exposure; e) health care workers suffering from permanent injuries as a consequence of 
non-mandatory vaccinations made in order to prevent work-place hazards; f) whoever 
suffers from permanent disabilities as a consequence of non-mandatory vaccinations made 
for reasons of work or for traveling abroad. 
The financial provisions for the claimants totally burdened the National Treasury, 
but were much less than what hemophiliacs had demanded. A non-joint monthly life 
pension amounting to about $700 and calculated according to the legal criteria applied for 
the disabled ex-servicemen pensions, was to be paid to the claimants starting from the 
month following the filing of the claim. In case the claimants should die a lump sum of 
approximately $35,000 was to be awarded to the relatives (but solely if they financially 
depended on the deceased person) in the following order: spouse, minor son, major 
disabled son, parents, minor brothers and sisters, major disabled brothers and sisters.  
A time-bar of ten years from the actual notice of the HIV contamination was 
established for filing the claim (reduced to three years in case of infection from hepatitis). 
For those already contaminated by the date of enactment of the Act, a shorter three-years 
time-bar was set. Concerning the determination of the claim, the onus was on the claimant 
to furnish medical documentation in order to establish when, how, and from which 
transfusion event or AFC administration the HIV contamination stemmed. Paradoxically 
for hemophiliacs, who have always been Army-exempted, the military medical 
commissions were appointed for evaluating the causal link between the event and the 
contamination. Finally, the compensation scheme did mention any estoppel for claimants 
willing to file a tort lawsuit against the potential “responsible” for their contamination.  
Reviewing all the legal problems raised by the formulation of the Act would be 
misplaced in this context; suffice here to say that its legal provisions were themselves 
evidence of the hasty climate in which they had been approved by the Parliament. From a 
political standpoint, the Act betrayed the blood victims’ expectations: the financial relief 
envisaged was a meager pay even for covering the everyday needs of those living with 
HIV. Very soon, both the API and the IHF publicly raised their discontent: the lump-sum 
award set to compensate the tragic death of the victim of blood contamination was 
renamed by the hemophiliac representatives a “mite from the State”, to signify its 
inadequacy to compensate for the death of a beloved. 
Finally, after three years of protests by the API and the IHF, the Italian 
Government emended the Act, issuing in August 1995 a Decree-law which raised the 
lump-sum to approximately $100.000150. The Decree also introduced other positive 
amendments for the beneficiaries of the Act. The lump-sum was to be due to the relatives 
                                                          
149 In GU 6 March 1992, n.55. 
150 Decree-law 28 August 1995, n.362 (in GU 30 August 1995, n.202). 
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of the deceased party also if they did not depend financially on the original claimant. The 
life pension and the lump-sum in case of death were to be autonomously claimed also by 
the spouse infected through sexual intercourse with the contaminated partner, and also by 
the child contaminated through the mother during pregnancy. Claimants who suffered 
from more than one disease (as in the case of coexisting contamination by HIV and HCV) 
were to receive supplementary awards. The administrative task of determining the claim 
was given to civil health facilities, instead of military medical commissions.  
Unfortunately for claimants, these amendments were enacted by means of a 
Decree-law151. Starting from August 1995, these new provisions were kept in force by the 
Government by re-enacting the Decree every two months, until December 1996, when 
finally these new provisions were converted into law by Parliament152. 
 
The Implementation of the Plan: An Example to Forget 
One of the pivotal reasons that militate for the enactment of a no-fault 
compensation plan is to ensure quick relief to a group of victims of misfortunes, enabling 
them to by-pass the burden of an uncertain action in court153, and allocating the litigation-
related transaction costs to compensate the injureds for the losses154. However, in the 
drama of the victims of HIV-tainted blood contamination, quick relief is the issue at stake. 
Accordingly, it had been hoped that the initial ‘meager’ compensation of the 1992 Act 
would at least be counter-balanced by an efficient administrative handling of the claims 
filed, in order to guarantee a prompt and effective response to demands for financial 
support.  
At the end of 1992, the claims received by the Health Ministry already amounted 
to 2,045, of which only 886 were examined for prima-facie determination. No claimants 
had been summoned for medical examination by the commissions in charge of evaluating 
the causal validity of the claim. These first data brought to light the overwhelming 
disproportion between claims based on blood-related HIV contamination (844) and those 
based on vaccine-related accidents (only 44).  
While setting a time-bar for claimants, the Act did not imposed a time-bar upon 
the Health Ministry for settling the claims quickly. In this respect, claimants are legally 
defenseless, given the unavailability of an administrative law-based cause of action for 
speeding up the ministerial passage of the records. The no-fault plan management 
followed the logic of the Italian bureaucracy: Only in November 1993 did the Health 
Ministry create an ad hoc bureau, which, in the maze of ministerial departments and sub-
departments, had exclusive responsibility for administration of claims based on the Act. 
By then, the number of claims had risen to 3,412, and no claimants had yet received a 
penny from the State. In May 1995, 2,511 claims had been dealt with, and many heirs had 
received financial relief (604 claimant had died by that time). At the same time, the 
number of claims received by the ad hoc bureau had risen to 20,140. The last figure 
                                                          
151 On the distorted use of this “pragmatic answer to serious bottlenecks in the Italian 
representative system”, see LAPALOMBARA, quoted above, 115. Decree-laws, requiring a two-months re-
enactment until the legislative text is definitively approved by Parliament, often enable the executive to 
amend (at every re-enactment) important provisions of the text, with puzzling effects on the certainty of the 
law.  
152 Law 20 December 1996, n. 641 (GU 21 December 1996, n. 299). 
153 P.S.ATIYAH, P.CANE, Accidents, compensation and the law, 1987, London.  
154 K.S.ABRAHAM, L.LIEBMAN, quoted above, at 94.  
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available (as of April 1, 1996) indicates the incredible number of 26,978 claims, with 
3,408 pensions and 514 lump-sums already awarded for an expenditure of 
171,966,164,290 lire (approximately $110 million) by the Treasury155. 
In April 1996, on a petition determined by the case of a plaintiff, who, injured by 
anti-polio vaccine in the ‘60s, claimed to be compensated starting from then, the Italian 
Constitutional Court declared the unconstitutionality of a provision in the 1992 Act, 
which established the starting point of the pensions to be awarded at the time when the 
claim was filed by the injured party. The Court maintained that such limitation contrasted 
with the Oprandi ruling and with the constitutionally protected right-to-health156. 
Therefore, it ruled the claimant’s right to obtain the payment of the pension starting from 
the time when the injury actually occurred. According to this retroactive payment, and 
taking into account the interest rates and the inflation-adjustments of the sums due, the 
Treasury’s expenditure for the coverage of the compensation plan will rise enormously157. 
To date, a constitutional petition has not yet been made by the HIV contaminated 
beneficiaries of the 1992 Act. Should this happen, it can be easily predicted that, on the 
basis of the equality clause of the Constitution, the same time-extension will be 
constitutionally granted, entitling claimants to receive the pensions from the time when 
the HIV contamination was first discovered. 
National budget constraints, due to the forthcoming integration of the European 
monetary systems, press the Italian Government today to cut welfare programs. But the 
legal process, as seen above, pushes in the opposite direction. Five years after its 
enactment, the 1992 compensation scheme has became a time-bomb for the Italian 
Treasury. In March 1997, press reported the Government’s inability to find budget 
resources to be allocated for the payments of the claims brought under the 1992 Act158.  
Meanwhile, for the many waiting claimants the only perspective for enforcing 
their rights is to file a claim before the European Court of Human Rights. Possibly, only 
the Strasbourg Judges, by condemning the Italian Government for denying justice on the 
basis of art. 6 of the European Convention159, will write the final chapter of the never-
ending saga of the Italian compensation plan.  
 
The Italian Litigation by Victims of HIV-Tainted Blood  
Analysis of the legal controversies aroused by the HIV-tainted blood 
contamination in Italy must consider separately the hemophiliacs and transfusion 
recipients litigation.  
In this latter case, in fact, factual circumstances of each lawsuit may greatly vary, 
and entail a cause of action based on medical malpractice, either for negligent prescription 
                                                          
155 All the data above are documented by ministerial communications provided to the present writer 
by the API, after an unsuccessful formal request for information made to the Health Ministry in May 1996.  
156 Corte Costituzionale 18 April 1996, n.118, in Foro It., 1996, I, 2325. 
157 In the remand judgment on the case the plaintiff of the constitutional ruling was awarded the 
incredible sum of $1,2 million; see Pretura Firenze 10 October 1996, Manichi v. Ministero della Sanità.  
158 Danni da trasfusioni in attesa [Transfusions damages are waiting], Il Sole 24 ore, March, 25, 
1996.  
159 Already in 1992, in the X v. French Government decision of 31 March 1992, the European 
Court of the Human Rights condemned the French Government for the unreasonable delay of the 
administrative action brought by a HIV-contaminated hemophiliac under the French compensation plan. 
The Court also awarded the claimant approximately $30.000 as compensation due by the Government as 
consequence of this delay.  
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of the transfusion, or for breach of the duty of care in testing blood. The legal focus, in 
both cases, is in the concept of negligence, the burden being on the plaintiff to establish 
evidence on the elements of the cause of action. The issues at stake in this kind of 
litigation should be examined after reporting on the hemophiliacs legal claims, which in 
Italy appear to have followed a litigation strategy quite different from that undertaken by 
other hemophiliac national communities. 
In 1990, an article published in the Italian edition of the British Medical Journal 
outlined a comparison of the claims for compensation lodged by HIV-contaminated 
hemophiliacs in several nations. Reporting on the domestic situation, the author of the 
article asserted that no lawsuits had yet been filed in Italy, either against the Government 
or against pharmaceutical companies or hospitals. This was explained on the hasty 
presumption that Italian attorneys, consulted by hemophiliacs, were dissuading to sue160.  
The National Bar Association did not sue the author of such a defamatory 
statement for the class, but, as early as in 1989, the IHF, with the support of the Italian 
Lawyer Association for Human Rights Protection, had urged HIV-contaminated 
hemophiliacs to address a letter to the Health Minister and to pharmaceutical companies, 
claiming damages and reserving the right to sue, in order to interrupt the general 
limitation term which bar tort actions after five years had elapsed since the injured had 
knowledge of the harm.  
At that time, it had become clear that hemophiliac contamination involved a case 
of mass tort litigation, in which the legal and factual elements of each claim could be 
deemed common to the entire class of potential plaintiffs. Lawyers close to the 
hemophiliacs organizations were trying to devise a common litigation strategy for the 
class, being painfully aware that the Italian legal system does not provide for a procedural 
instrument comparable to the American class action.  
For any Italian lawyer, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
gather information from hundreds of potential plaintiffs spread throughout the country, 
and to counsel them to sue the “responsible” of their contamination before a single 
tribunal. Many personal dramas were going on, with a plethora of diverse, individual 
reactions to the tragedy, and with a unique common fear: being forced to publicly disclose 
the identity of their drama once in court. In the face of these problems, it could have been 
useful to bargain the cost of the litigation with the clients in order to convince them to 
start a lengthy and uncertain action in justice against a powerful defendant (be it the State 
or the pharmaceutical companies), as it would have been possible for an American 
colleague. But this was not permitted to Italian lawyers. The “looser pays all” rule usually 
applies in Italy, and the rules of professional conduct of the Bar prohibit the contingency 
fee. Moreover, lawyers are banned from recruiting clients. A letter or a telephone call 
with which a lawyer attempts to reach potential clients, informing them on the possibility 
to sue, would be considered advertising and, as such, contrary to the law of the Bar.  
These considerations may help to understand why today the number of lawsuits 
pending before the Italian courts as consequence of the HIV contamination is, as we shall 
see in a moment, quite limited. To a certain extent, they may also explain the critical role 
played by the two Italian hemophiliac organizations in illustrating to their members the 
possible strategies to be pursued in court.  
                                                          
160 A.BONO, Emoderivati e HIV: la questione dell’indennizzo, in B.M.J. (Italian edition.), 13, 1990, 
161. 
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This role is emphasized by the description of the different litigation paths which 
have been advocated by the API and the IHF. While the former, supporting two lawsuits 
filed in 1990 before the Genoa Tribunal, encouraged its members to bring a legal action 
against pharmaceutical companies, the latter sponsored a radically different tactic of 
litigation. This diverse counseling led more than three-hundred hemophiliacs to sue the 
Italian Government in 1993 before the Tribunal of Rome. Despite the particular and 
urgent nature of the claims, both the Genoa and Rome actions are still pending. 
Considering the controversial issues at stake, this is -- unfortunately -- not surprising. In 
Italy, on the average, an ordinary tort lawsuit requiring expert witness testimonies may 
take from four to eight years to result in a decision. The traditional slowness of the Italian 
machinery of justice is another factor that may have played a critical role in deterring 
hemophiliacs from seeking justice in court on an individual basis161. 
 
The Genoa Lawsuits against Pharmaceutical Companies  
On January 1990, API announced that two actions had been filed before the Genoa 
Tribunal against two different pharmaceutical companies (the Italian Sclavo and the 
Austrian Immuno). The complaints were also brought against the Health and the Internal 
Affair Ministries. In both cases, the plaintiffs were parents of hemophiliac children died 
of AIDS after contamination resulted from administration of AFC. One of the two was the 
Rocco’s father, who in 1995 will narrate the sad story of his unfortunate son in the only 
book that - to date - has outlined a story of the hemophiliac contamination in Italy162.  
In the Rocco lawsuit, which differs from the other one only for the name of the 
company sued, facts narrate the massive administration of a brand of factor VIII AFC 
marketed by the Italian company between 1983 and 1986, the discovery of HIV infection 
in 1985, and the death of the child in 1987. The complaint alleges the Sclavo liability in 
marketing AFC without duly warning the consumer about the viral risk entailed by the 
administration of the product, while the government authorities are blamed for not having 
duly controlled the product before issuing authorization for sale and for not having carried 
out timely, while the product was marketed, subsequent control and verification measures 
on the contamination hazard.  
From the legal standpoint, since the 1988 product liability Act does not apply to 
products marketed before its enactment163, the claim is cumulativily based, both on the 
general cause of action codified for negligence claims by art. 2043 of the Italian Civil 
Code164, and on the special liability clause envisaged by art. 2050 of the Code. This latter 
depicts a severe regime of liability for defendants who cause harm in the exercise of 
                                                          
161 The “biblical” duration of the Italian civil proceedings has been already condemned in 785 
claims presented by Italian plaintiffs before the European Court of Human Rights, see Processi lenti, il 
record italiano [Slow proceedings, the Italian record], Sole 24 ore, April 9, 1996.  
162 G.MILANO, G.MICÒ, Puoi correre Rocco. Sangue e AIDS: cronaca di uno scandalo italiano 
[You can run Rocco. Blood and AIDS: chronicle of an Italian scandal], 1995, Rome. 
163 It must be stressed that the Italian product liability rules consider blood derivatives to be 
products like all others: the legal definition of product encompasses any movable chattel with the exception 
of products not manufactured by a professional producer and not intended for sale. Whether this is clear for 
industrially manufactured blood and plasma derivatives, the same is not so obvious for fresh blood to be 
transfused, see infra. 
164 The article prescribes: “(A)ny fraudulent, malicious or negligent act that causes an unjustified 
injury to another obliges the person who has committed the act to pay damages”, art.2043, in M.BELTRAMO, 
G.E.LONGO, J.H.MERRYMAN, The Italian Civil Code, 1969, Oceana, 503. 
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dangerous activities165. Clearly, it is particularly relevant for the plaintiff to obtain the 
application of this stricter standard of liability to the defendants conduct, since this would 
overturn the burden of the proof in the litigation.  
According to the general rule of liability for unlawful acts, in fact, in order to 
prevail, plaintiffs need to establish the damages suffered, its causal connection with the 
administration of the AFC marketed by defendants and the violation of a duty of 
reasonable care by the pharmaceutical companies. The first burden for plaintiffs is to 
prove the causal connection. Rather than the contamination cause, at stake is the plaintiffs 
ability to establish when the contamination occurred166. This timing will be crucial in 
evaluating the claim of negligence made against the defendant companies. And it is 
precisely on this evaluation that the “dangerous activities standard” would apply, 
enhancing considerably the perspective of success for plaintiffs. Should the Genoa Court 
hold the applicability of this standard to the cases, defendants would have to prove that 
they took all the possible measures to avert the risk that AFC could be contaminated by 
HIV.  
In order to determine weather this severe standard may apply in the Genoa 
lawsuits and, if so, the likely consequences on the final decision, it is worth describing the 
legal principles established by the (above mentioned) Trilergan litigation, whose factual 
circumstances appear extremely similar to those at stake in the pending lawsuits.  
The Trilergan case has offered to the Italian Corte di Cassazione the opportunity 
to clarify whether the production, the import and the marketing of drugs should be 
considered a dangerous activity. When, in the second half of the ‘70s, several lawsuits 
were brought throughout Italy both against the two Italian pharmaceutical companies 
which had respectively marketed and imported the Trilergan and against the American 
supplier of the gamma-globulins used for the drug production, plaintiffs sustained that the 
defendants’ activities were dangerous. To support this conclusion they alleged a host of 
considerations: the regulations then in force in the blood sector envisaged the risk of the 
transmission of hepatitis through blood and its derivatives, thereby qualifying their 
production and marketing as dangerous; scientific evidence proved that, when facts 
occurred in 1974, HBsAG antigen screening of plasma and serum was a widespread 
practice; the WHO had recommended to exclude serum testing positive for HBsAG from 
the production process of blood derivatives; scientific opinions, although not unanimously 
accepted at the time, admitted that gammaglobulins might be carriers of the hepatitis B 
virus.  
Once established in trial that a batch of drug confections was positive for the 
presence of HBsAG because it had been obtained from tainted gammaglobulins supplied 
by the American company, the cornerstone of the litigation became the establishing of the 
dangerousness of the defendants’ activities and, subsequently, whether defendants had 
taken all foreseeable precautions to prevent contamination.  
                                                          
165 “(W)hoever causes injury to another in the performance of an activity dangerous by its nature or 
by reason of the instrumentalities employed, is liable for damages, unless he proves that he had taken all 
suitable measures to avoid the injury”, art.2050, ibid., 504. 
166 A major problem for the plaintiff can be accomplishing this task once several years had passed 
from the event: this special burden, due to the long latency of the disease, is common to all the HIV-related 
tort claims. Evidence are to be found in medical records: note that until 1986 Italian hospitals were not 
mandatorily required to archive these latter. It was only starting from a Circular issued on December 19, 
1986 (in RIML, 1987, 672) that the Health Ministry ordered the unlimited conservation of medical records, 
establishing that each health facility must keep the registers for no less than 40 years. 
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The final word on this critical legal issue was pronounced by the Cassazione in a 
1987 landmark167. The Court clearly stated that all activities subject to regulation for the 
purpose of protecting the public safety and having an intrinsic potential dangerousness are 
relevant for the application of the strict standard of liability prescribed by art. 2050 of the 
civil code.  
Concerning the alleged defense that all the precautions possible at the time had 
been duly taken to avoid the production of the harm, the Court maintained that 
pharmaceutical companies should have produced instead “positive” proof of having 
performed the RIA test on gammaglobulins. This, despite the fact that this test was not 
imposed at the time, either by the FDA regulations to which the American producer was 
subjected, or by the Italian regulations on the import and marketing of the 
immunoglobulins.  
Although conceding that the RIA test was considered experimental at the time, the 
Court stressed that this screening was nevertheless known to the scientific community as a 
possible means for screening hepatitis B. As such, its adoption should have been required. 
Moreover, the Court extended its ruling to all the different activities (production, import, 
marketing) of the defendant companies. Each of the defendants’ activities, in fact, was to 
be considered part of a single process, which had exposed the injured recipient to the 
hazard resulting from the use of a drug obtained by a raw blood component at risk of 
transmitting viral agents. 
The rule resulting from the Trilergan litigation clearly allocates the development-
risks liability to the pharmaceutical companies168. This ruling has been upheld several 
times by the Cassazione169, and, albeit Italian courts are not bound by the stare decisis 
principle, it is to be expected that it will find application in the Genoa lawsuits170.  
In the Rocco’s trial, defendant Sclavo denied its liability, arguing that AFC had 
been imported from Cutter Biological and that only this latter was under the obligation to 
test the product. The American company subsequently intervened, contesting, against the 
Trilergan rule, the applicability of art. 2050 of the Civil Code to the case. In its view, the 
shifting of the negligence standards applies only when the harm occurs as a consequence 
of the inherent dangerousness of the product (as in the case of a gas cylinder), not when 
this feature is related to the producer’s activity (as in the case of pharmaceutical 
industries).  
This argument is not new, since the interpretation advocated by Cutter was 
overruled by the Italian jurisprudence precisely on the occasion of the Trilergan litigation. 
Possibly, defendants will have to face the necessity to prove that, at the time when the 
injured party tested HIV-positive, and according to even minority opinions expressed by 
the medical literature of the time, the theoretical possibility of obtaining HIV-free AFC 
did not even exist.  
                                                          
167 Cass. 15 July 1987, Foro It., 1988, I, 144. 
168 Compare D.CARUSO, Quando il rimedio è peggiore del male: emoderivati infetti e responsabilità 
civile, in Foro It., 1988, I, 144, 152, quoting the example of the liability rule which resulted in the American 
vaccine producers “crisis” of the early ‘80s as reported by P.HUBER, Safety and second best: the hazard of 
public risk management in the Courts, in 85 Colum.L.Rev. 277, 285 (1985).  
169 In one of these decision (Cass. 20 July 1993, Foro It., 1994, I, 455) the Court actualized the 
fairness of the rule by quoting as an example precisely the AIDS contamination risk of pharmaceutical 
products. 
170 According to a recent legal analysis on the HIV-tainted blood liability, the applicability of the 
Trilergan rule in the case of AFC contamination would be out of the question, compare M.BISCIONE, HIV 
da trasfusione, emoderivati e responsabilità civile, in Danno e responsabilità, 1996, 145,149. 
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In this respect, the scientific determination resulting from the opposed views 
advocated by the parties’ expert witnesses testimonies will be crucial171.  
 
Blaming the State in Court  
The claims brought against the State in the two Genoa lawsuits must be examined 
together with the IHF sponsored case pending before the Rome Tribunal, given their 
similar nature. This latter is aimed at holding legally accountable the Italian State for the 
shortcomings displayed in setting forth the regulatory response to prevent hemophiliacs 
HIV-contamination. The claim also blames the State for a twenty-year delay in setting up 
an efficient blood and plasma collection system. The alleged liability is based on the 
general cause of action for negligent conduct of art. 2043 of the Italian Civil Code.  
This action has taken years to be organized and prepared. Possibly, never a single 
lawsuit promoted by well 340 plaintiffs was filed before an Italian Court. This enterprise 
was made possible through the assistance of the IHF, whose secretary, a lawyer, is also a 
member of the hemophiliacs defense team. The plaintiffs’ concern about the risk of public 
disclosure of their names was dealt by asking to the President of the Rome Tribunal to 
apply the AIDS Act of 1990. Names were omitted in the complaint and listed in a separate 
document kept in the registry of the court, to be disclosed only to the defendants 
attorneys. Although the number of plaintiffs may stand for the contrary, the pending case 
is not a class action. According to the Italian rules of civil procedure, the Court has the 
power to split the action in separate, individual actions at any time of the proceeding. 
In analyzing the hemophiliacs’ claims against the State from a legal point of view, 
it is quite difficult to draw a clear distinction between their legal value and their political 
significance. The complaint narrates the political history of the Italian blood system, 
underlying the failure of the Italian Government in timely enacting a national blood plan. 
This would have permitted to achieve the Italian plasma self-sufficiency before the 
occurrence of contamination from AFC derived from American HIV-tainted plasma, the 
assumption being that plasma collected in Italy would have not carried the virus. The 
Government is also blamed for the belated withdrawal of unheated AFC in the period 
between December 1984 and July 1985.  
It is a technically arduous undertaking to envisage in the Italian legal system a 
government liability for failure to legislate172. The Italian State was recently held 
                                                          
171 “For those who favor the law’s adopting a scientific approach to selecting information for fact 
finders to consider, it might seem appealing for the law to adopt a scientific attitude toward uncertainty 
about causation. Since science and law gather information for different ultimate purposes, however, it does 
not make sense for the two fields to respond identically to uncertainty about matters of fact. Law and 
science both seek correct factual information, but the two enterprises have different interests in this 
information. At one level, science pursues correct information simply to achieve a better understanding of 
the natural world. At another level, science seeks information in order to predict -- and, ultimately, to 
control -- what happens in the world. Regardless of which end -- understanding or control -- motivates a 
scientist, the appropriate response to uncertainty is to delay reaching a final conclusion until further research 
settle the issue. (...) Understanding the natural world or predicting its behavior reliably requires factual 
corrects conclusions, but conclusiveness in and of itself has no independent importance. In law, the situation 
is different. Law pursues correct information in order to settle the disputes promptly, decisively, and justly. 
Each of these goals is sometimes best served by deciding upon a final result in the face of uncertainty about 
seemingly pivotal matters of fact. (...) In law, in contrast to science, closure and finality have value in their 
own right.”, H.L.FELDMAN, Science and uncertainty in mass exposure litigation, 74 Tex. L.Rev., 1 (1995), 1 
at 41-43. 
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responsible for “legislative omission” by the European Court of Justice for the belated 
enactment of a statute which should have adopted an European Union Directive, in a 
claim brought by a group of plaintiffs who were financially harmed by this delay173.  
But this does not seem extensible to the current ”State litigation” by hemophiliacs. 
In that case, in fact, the finding of State liability (limited to pecuniary losses) was 
supported by the argument that the Italian Government, joining the European treaty, had 
assumed the obligation to apply the European directives in its legal system also before its 
citizens. Concretely, the European decision was deprived of any positive effect for the 
original plaintiffs when they claimed the application of the ruling before the Italian Court 
of Cassazione. The Court rejected the European principle, arguing that the Italian legal 
system does not envisage the State liability for omitted legislation toward private citizens, 
given the Government’s full sovereignty in its political decisions and legislative 
determinations174.  
Nevertheless the “three-hundred’s lawsuit” pursues a specific strategy, sustaining 
that, through the enactment of the 1992 Compensation Plan, the State indirectly 
acknowledged its responsibility for the hemophiliacs contamination. Following this 
perspective, the lawsuit attempts to take advantage of the causal connection between the 
infection occurred to hemophiliacs and their use of AFC, as ascertained in the 
administrative trials held under the Compensation Plan Act. In the plaintiffs’ view, this 
would help to accomplish the otherwise difficult task of proving the causal connection of 
more than three-hundred cases of contamination. It is too early to say whether this attempt 
will succeed, although it must be pointed out that the causation judgment by the medical 
commissions of the Compensation Plan Act seems to have a loser nature than the more 
severe inquiry required in a tort action. Conclusively, the three-hundred’s litigation, as a 
completely new case, has to climb a slippery slope175. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
172 The Italian legal system’s tradition and, more generally, the civil law tradition historically 
encompasses the private/public law dichotomy. Accordingly, the government liability for failing to legislate 
has to confront the fact that, according to public law, public bodies are under a duty to act fairly towards 
citizens. This duty does not give rise to a subjective right; it gives rise only to (what is technically defined 
as) a “legitimate expectation” or “legitimate interest”. The result is that, so far, in Italian law the preclusive 
effect on a tort claims for damages based on an unlawful act or an omission by the government has 
substantially been similar from the exception based on the “king-can-do-no-wrong” privilege and resulting 
in the government (or “sovereign”) immunity from private tort claims of the common law legal tradition 
(J.R.ROBERTSON, The effects of consent decrees on local legislative immunity, in 56 U.Chi.L.R. [1989], 
1121). In the hemophiliacs litigation attempt is made of presenting the tort claim as based on a subjective 
right inferred from the constitutional right to health, stressing the idea that the administrative supervision of 
the Health Ministry in the public health sector is eventually addressed to protect a subjective right of the 
citizens. In this perspective, logical arguments may be borrowed by what common lawyers would define 
“specific detrimental reliance” (i.e. the duty to continue past warnings which have induced reliance by the 
plaintiff), M.K.WOODALL, Private law liability of public authorities for negligent inspection and regulation, 
in 37 McGill L.J. (1992), 83. 
173 European Court of Justice 19 November 1991, Francovich v. Repubblica Italiana, Foro It., 
1992, IV, 150 on which R.CARANTA, Governmental liability after Francovich, in 52 [1993] Camb. L.J. 272-
297. Broadly put, the Court held that Governments of Member States shall make good any damage suffered 
by individuals owing to the non-implementation of EEC directives or, more generally, by any act or 
omission imputed to a branch of the government which turns out to be inconsistent with Community law. 
174 See Cass. 11 October 1995, n.10617, in Danno e responsabilità, 1996, 78, and the comment by 
G.ROSCIONE, Mancata attuazione di direttive comunitarie: la cassazione nega l’illecito dello Stato, ibid., 80. 
175 For an anticipate negative verdict, F.MERISI, Sulla configurabilità di una responsabilità della 
pubblica amministrazione nell’esercizio dell’attività di vigilanza. Il caso degli emofilici colpiti dall’AIDS, 
in Rass. giur. sanità, 70, 1990. 
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But aside from the judicial outcome of this lawsuit, and beyond the strong political 
message of the action, what really surprises is that in the ‘three-hundred lawsuit’ 
hemophiliacs have not sued, along with the Italian State, the pharmaceutical companies. 
Asked to give an explanation for what appears to be an odd benevolence toward the AFC 
producers, especially on the basis of the pro-plaintiff legal framework existing in the 
Genoa lawsuits, the IHF secretary replied that the Rome lawsuit intended to force the 
State to call on a guarantor the pharmaceutical industries in order to be relieved from the 
hemophiliacs’ legal claim.  
But this has not happened to date and it does not seem likely to happen in the 
future, since the Government lawyers sustain the complete inadmissibility of the action, 
for the reasons already set out.  
 
Physician and Hospital Liability for Transfusion-related Cases of HIV 
Contamination  
Despite the epidemiological numbers seen above, the Italian Digests do not report 
yet decisions on lawsuits brought by HIV-contaminated transfusion recipients. It is, 
nonetheless, likely that this is a temporary feature, since it is almost certain that pending 
litigation would be detected by scrutinizing every single civil docket of the Italian 
Tribunals.  
In a recent unpublished case involving HCV contamination176, two doctors who 
had administered HCV-tainted blood to the plaintiff, as well as the hospital where the 
transfusion had occurred, were jointly held liable for the occurrence of contamination. 
The claim was based on the physicians’ breach of a duty of care in deciding that the 
patient should undergo transfusion, since the scientific experts’ testimonies established 
that his pathology did not require blood transfusion as a mandatory life-saving therapeutic 
treatment.  
The finding of negligence was supported by the ruling that doctors should have 
known the risk of contamination through blood transfusion, especially with regard to the 
HCV virus, which in 1988 (when events occurred) was well known in medical literature 
as an unavoidable hazard for transfused patients. The hospital’s joint liability followed on 
the basis of the vicarious liability arousing from the employment relationship between the 
tortfeasor physicians and the hospital.  
In the absence of case-law on the subject, discussion of the blood transfusion-
related litigation entails a hypothetical analysis, which is based on the application of the 
concept of negligence and of the related doctrine of informed consent by the patient. The 
hardship in these cases, once again, is establishing the causal connection. This goal can be 
pursued only through a look-back analysis to find the donor’s identity. Given the lack of 
institutional programs, plaintiffs may find it difficult to trace the transfusion chain back to 
the original donor.  
The standard inquiry would begin with the transfused blood unit data logged on 
the recipient’s medical record in order to give a name to the donor. The donor (who may 
be still asymptomatic) could then be requested to take a test for HIV. This gives rise to an 
intricate legal issue, since donors can refuse discovery on the basis of the constitutional 
                                                          
176 Tribunal Milan 22 May 1995, Pasquariello v. Pellanda et al.. 
 48
provision that shields individuals from medical treatment not imposed by an express 
statutory provision.  
Possibly, an Italian attorney would suggest to file a criminal charge for personal 
injury against the responsible of the transfusion (i.e. the head of the transfusion center), in 
order to take advantage of the investigative powers assigned to criminal prosecutors. The 
criminal findings may then support the tort action. In the lack of a successful discovery, 
plaintiffs may confront the defendant’s attempt to shed light on the personal “bad habits” 
of the injured plaintiff. Judges are likely to face a dilemma in which their final opinion 
must rely on presumptions.  
On successful completion of the causal judgment, the litigation path for the 
plaintiff appears less problematic. Given the detailed set of technical regulations 
surrounding transfusion practice, any omission or error by the transfusion physician or the 
auxiliary personnel of the center with respect to standard practice is likely to grant a 
finding of negligence. Moreover, the doctrine of informed consent requires the treating 
doctor, who decides on the therapeutic necessity of transfusion, to inform the patient of 
the risks involved, pointing out (should the treatment not have been urged by imminent 
danger to the life of the patient) the availability of autologous transfusion177. This, for 
instance, is the case for transfusions in cosmetic surgery.  
The extension of the dangerous activity standard to medical treatment and, more 
generally, to transfusional practice should be excluded. The Italian jurisprudence, as well 
as legal scholars, maintains that the standard applies only to industrial activities, not to the 
personal, professional performance of physicians, which is to be subjected to the general 
regime of liability for negligence178. Also the strict liability standard set out by the 1988 
Act, should be unavailable for claims brought by HIV-infected blood recipients. 
Apparently, in fact, in the Italian legal system blood is considered a non-marketable good. 
This, apparently, would prevent courts from considering blood a product and179, 
consequently, to apply the Act.  
Economic insight, however, may well suggest the contrary180. The principle of full 
gratuitousness of blood is endorsed by the law solely for the political choice of impeding 
the circulation of this good in the market. Blood, however, is not free. The costs of 
collection and safety of blood are considered also by the Italian law, which in fact 
establishes a token price for the transfer of blood bags among transfusion centers. 
Moreover, these costs are sustained by recipients when paying hospital fees, in case 
transfusion takes place in private health facilities, or through general taxation or 
prescription charges when transfusion is performed in public hospitals. 
 
The Blood System Reform of 1990 
                                                          
177 L.P.COMOGLIO, Consenso informato e profili di responsabilità nelle donazioni di sangue, Foro 
It., 1992, V, 363, 373. 
178 According to BISCIONE (quoted above, 278) the transfusion center activity should instead be 
considered dangerous, according to the known and statistically foreseeable risk of transmission of viral 
diseases that it implies. 
179 In the absence of express statutory provisions, like those of the “Blood shield statutes” enacted 
in many States of the USA (Bayer, USA, in Bayer and Feldman), the question weather blood can be 
considered a product will have to be interpreted by courts.  
180 BISCIONE, quoted above, 279-80. 
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The occurrence of HIV-tainted blood contamination forced the Italian Parliament 
to came to terms with the need of a radical reform of the national blood system, after more 
than a decade of vain legislative debates181.  
The system’s inability at ensuring national supply of blood and plasma had 
exposed Italy to the international tragedy. This had thought to Italian policy-makers that, 
with regard to blood, the quality vs. quantity dichotomy was deceptive. The two issues 
should have been addressed jointly. Blood and plasma safety, notwithstanding all possible 
efforts to enhance and ameliorate viral screening and virucidal treatments of blood and its 
components, was to be pursued by achieving national self-sufficiency. By the end of the 
‘80s, self-sufficiency in blood and plasma, after all, had become a European slogan. The 
Council of Europe first182 and the European Economic Community183 (EEC, now: 
European Union, UE) then, urged Italy to reshape its blood system according to two 
general guidelines: achievement of self sufficiency and voluntary and non-remunerated 
blood donations.  
In May 1990 the Italian blood system received its awaited general reform. A new 
Act repealed the twenty-three-year-old regulations184, implementing the regionalization of 
the sector only formally declared by the 1978 Health Reform Act. Accordingly, 
transfusion activity is now conceived as an integral part of the National Health System. 
All transfusion facilities and the (few) blood derivatives production centers still directly 
run in 1990 by the non-profit sector (mainly AVIS in Lombardy and the Red Cross in the 
Rome area) are under the public aegis of the National Health System. Blood collection is 
based solely on periodic voluntary blood donations, and the general principle that blood 
donation and distribution should be completely gratuitous is affirmed185.  
Blood and its components can not be considered a source of profit and are declared 
tax-exempt. The blood collection cost, as well the fractionation, preservation and 
distribution ones, are charged to the Health National Fund budget, with a ‘political’ price 
(for blood units transfers between transfusion centers) being issued yearly by ministerial 
decree.  
In order to monitor the quantity and quality of the blood produced and 
administered by each region, regional blood registers have been set up. The blood donor 
associations are institutionally involved in the administration of blood collection and are 
entitled to negotiate agreements with the regional transfusion authorities. Regionalization 
also means today the responsibility of regional authorities at issuing blood regional plans. 
These are conceived to be an integral part of the national blood plan. A Commission for 
the National Transfusion Activities (CNTA) has been created in Rome, as a consultative 
organ to the Health Ministry for drawing up-to-dated criteria for implementation of the 
national policy toward blood safety and self-sufficiency. In this board, two representatives 
                                                          
181 ZANA, quoted above, 840, reporting and discussing several proposals of reform under 
examination by the Parliament already in 1985. 
182 Recommendation R (88) 4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
responsibilities of health authorities in the field of blood transfusion (adopted on March 7, 1988). 
183 EEC Directive 89/381, 14 June 1989, in GUCE 28 June 1989, n.181 and GU 2a Ss. 21 August 
1989, n.65. 
184 Law 4 May 1990, n.107, in GU 11 May 1990, n.108. 
185 This principle is, after all, strongly rooted in the conscience of Italians. A 1994 survey carried 
out on behalf of the European Commission reveals that the overwhelming majority of Italians (88%) 
believes that blood donations should be completely free, as opposed to the 1% who accept the marketability 
of blood, Europeans and blood, in EUROBAROMETER 41.0, 1995.  
 50
give voice to the hemophiliac and multi-transfused subjects organizations’ right to 
participate to the institutional decision-making over blood and plasma safety.  
Selling the oro rosso is now an ad hoc crime in Italy. Specific criminal 
punishments have been enforced to deter infringements of the regulations issued by the 
new Act. Whoever, by any means, profits economically from blood, or infringe the 
mandatory requirements described in the Act with regard to almost all the single phases of 
the transfusional activity is severely punished. A three-years maximum prison sentence is 
provided in this case, along with fines ranging from $300 to $15,000, while habitual 
offenders risk more severe punishment186.  
The Act also contains basic rules concerning donation requirements, donors 
features, and medical controls on donors, although -- as we shall see -- a wave of technical 
regulation concerning safety has been subsequently issued by Ministerial decrees.  
 
The Productive Structure of the System 
A soviet-like spirit of planning has been endorsed by the Act in order to enhance 
the productivity of the blood system187. Words like “plan”, “implementation”, 
“coordination”, “supervision” and a number of acronyms corresponding to a host of 
hierarchically organized bodies are impossible to avoid in describing the new structure of 
the Italian blood system.  
The national transfusion system received a new organization chart made of 
Collection Units (CU), Transfusion Centers (TC) as well as Immunoematology and 
Transfusion Services (ITS). CU are fixed or mobile structures in charge of performing 
blood collection and plasmapheresis collection (CU), which are subjected to the technical 
supervision of TC, although they may be run directly by donors associations. TCs are 
established on a demographic ratio of one Center to every 150,000 inhabitants and carry 
out tests on donors, blood collection, blood typification, blood preservation, blood 
fractionation, blood allocation, and plasmapheresis; they also encourage self transfusion, 
guarantee the good use of blood, transmit collected plasma to the RCCCs coordinate CU, 
participate in epidemiological programs, and participate in educational programs 
encouraging blood donation among population. ITS are larger TC, established by a ratio 
of one Service to every 400,000 inhabitants or Province. Further to the TC tasks, they 
implement all measures aimed at evaluating and preventing post-transfusion diseases and, 
above all, viral diseases.  
                                                          
186 Italian criminal law has already registered the first applications of these new provisions. In May 
1996 the Director of a private clinic, who managed a system of recruitment of paid donors, was sentenced 
with 5 months of jail, E.VINCI, Scandalo sangue. Sanatrix condannata, La Repubblica, May 15, 1996. 
187 The Russian Alexander Bogdanov (1873-1928), the visionary founder of the Central Institute 
for Blood Transfusion of Moscow in 1926, would probably approve the new Italian regulations. Bogdanov, 
a prominent Bolshevik leader who was also a physician convinced of the rejuvenating powers of blood, 
theorized about transfusion efficiency. He intended to apply to blood the organizational principles 
developed under the name of “tektological laws” in his works THE RED STAR (1908), TEKTOLOGY (1912-
1928) and THE FIGHT FOR THE VITAL CAPACITY (1928). He dreamed about a scientific society in which 
production is based on a system of instantaneous information on productive capacities and consumer 
demands. Screens would have indicated deficits and potential surpluses of production, and calculated pre-
existing needs and available productive capacities. The Bogdanov’s utopia was an ideal form of planning 
which permits the coordination of centralized and decentralized behaviors through the instantaneousness of 
information, see R.TARTARIN, Transfusion sanguigne et immortalité chez Alexander Bogdanov, 28 Droit et 
Societé (1994), 565.  
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Regional Centers of Coordination and Compensation (RCCC), instead, implement 
and administer regional blood plans, with the task of filling the inter-regional gaps in the 
collection of blood and plasma. At a national level, the task of further coordinating the 
individual regional policies is assigned to ISS in Rome188, which has also to express 
scientific opinions on the technical regulations issued by the Health Ministry upon the 
advice of the CNTA. As one can see, the Italian legislative attitude of creating 
hierarchical administrative bodies was not betrayed by the Act. 
Also the voluntary donor organizations have been institutionalized by the reform. 
Their role as necessary mediators between health structures and general population has 
been fully acknowledged. But the Health Ministry now require them to abide their by-
laws by a set of goals determined in a ministerial decree189, as a necessary condition for 
being formally entitled to participate in the blood system. Regions are responsible for 
organizing local collecting activity by entering into special agreements with the donors 
organization. This negotiation is not unconstrained. Regional administrations must follow 
an uniform model of agreement set out by a Health Ministry decree, which provides for 
reimbursement to the organization proportionally to the quantity of blood supplied190. 
This financial contribution is not intended as remuneration. Yet it is an obvious incentive 
for donor organizations (the more blood they supply, the more financial aid they receive 
to pursue their non-profit goal)191. 
Planning and institutional coordination are the keywords for understanding the 
productive logic of the system, in the face of its sharp refusal of the market. This is 
especially true with regard to the reform’s complex scheme of management for the 
collection and transformation process of plasma. In a non-economic setting, the scheme 
conceived in 1990 seeks to coordinate the three actors of the system: the no-profit 
organizations of voluntary donors, the public transfusion centers (with their functions not 
restricted to transfusion practice but extended to include the processing of blood -- 
plasmapheresis, fractionation etc.); the private producers of blood derivatives (deemed not 
replaceable by public plants, given the know-how and the financial means required by 
their highly specialized activity).  
In short, the scheme is so conceived: plasma obtained directly by 
plasmapheresis192 in TC or by fractionation of whole blood collected by donors 
                                                          
188 ISS has also other important tasks of control. It promotes researches in the immunotransfusion 
field, collects data on transfusion practice, inspects the private industry’s plants were plasma is processed, 
and controls the quality of blood products.  
189 DM 7 June 1991 (in GU 26 June 1991, n.148).  
190 DM 18 September 1991, in GU 3 October 1991, n.232. The main guidelines of this ministerial 
pattern concern: the cooperation in promoting the culture of unpaid donation among the population; the 
coordination of donor recruitment in relation to the transfusion centers’ needs; the exchange of information 
on donor suitability; the adoption of insurance coverage for damages incurred by donors (note: not 
recipients) as a consequence of donation; the operational standards of the ministerial regulations concerning 
donor safety.  
191 This mechanism, based on the blood units supplied, boosts also the internal dynamics of the 
donor associations. In the AVIS national assembly the number of regional representatives is proportional to 
the number of donations obtained by each regional association. The same logic applies in regional and 
provincial assemblies.  
192 F.BENCIVELLI, A.PIVI, R.CAMPI, Plasmaferesi produttiva, in Il servizio trasfusionale, 1991, 11, 
who reports the different psychological approach to plasmapheresis shown by voluntary donors, given their 
perception that the gift is not immediately to the benefit of the patient. This impression makes donors less 
inclined to undergo the procedure, since the altruistic choice is weakened by the interposition of an 
industrial process between the two subjects of the gift relationship.  
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associations, should be gathered at a regional level by RCCC, and then delivered to 
private industry plants of production authorized by the Ministry. This latter should then 
return the final products (AFC) to the Region’s health structures, being paid on the basis 
of the liters of plasma processed. The raw plasma pertains to the regions even when this is 
processed, whereas the private company’s payment is due solely for the processing 
performance.  
Moreover, the reform regimented the choice of the private plants of production, 
renamed by the 1990 Act Blood Derivatives Production Centers (BDPC). Their number 
on the national territory is legally limited by a demographic ratio of one BDPC to every 
20,000,000 inhabitants. Private companies willing to apply for authorization must meet 
precise requirements set out by law: the plant must be located in Italy, be technologically 
updated, be able to carry out the whole process of production in Italy, be able to produce 
albumin, third generation immunoglobulins, and AFC according to the latest scientific 
knowledge on viral safety. 
Only in 1993, three years after enactment of the reform, a ministerial decree 
selected the two centers authorized to produce industrial blood derivatives in Italy193. 
These centers have a legal monopoly for negotiating agreements for plasma/plasma-
products exchange with the regional centers of plasma collection. Both the authorized 
plants, even if they apparently belong to different companies, were part of the same Italian 
pharmaceutical group (Marcucci group). The manifest limitation on free market entailed 
by this regulations has been ferociously contrasted by foreign pharmaceutical companies, 
which first challenged the Ministerial decree before the administrative courts and then 
promoted a consultative investigation by the Italian Competition Authority194. In July 
1996, however, the Marcucci group sold the companies owning the authorized plants to 
the Bayer pharmaceutical group.  
 
Plasma Autarchy: Will the Goal Be Achieved? 
The new rules of the Italian blood system seems to work well with regard to blood 
collection. In 1995 AVIS alone provided 1,415,288 units of whole blood, out of a total 
national need estimated at 2,400,000 units (source: AVIS Milan). Italy has almost 
achieved self-sufficiency in blood195, although occasionally deficits still occur in the 
South196. The gap between North and South may be overcome if the system manages to 
achieve a better level of coordination197. Targeted advertising campaigns have been 
                                                          
193 The authorization was issued by the DM 12 February 1993, in GU 20 February 1993, n.42 
194 In January 1996, the Authority concluded its investigation and, according to the Italian Antitrust 
law, transmitted a not-binding opinion to the Parliament on the opportunity to reform the 1990 Act. The 
opinion concluded that the limitation to competition entailed by the scrutinized regulations was not justified 
by safety considerations. On the contrary, this limitation had a counterproductive effect on safety, impeding 
the acquisition of better standard of quality which might be offered by competitors company. See, Italian 
Competition Authority notification January 26, 1996, Attività di trasformazione del plasma, available in 
Italian @ http://www.agcm.it/italiano/segnal/as0065.html. 
195 A.L.MASSARO, Stato di attuazione della legge 107/90, in 38 TS, 1993, 229, reporting a 15% 
deficit in Southern Regions. 
196 Stanno finendo le scorte. Sangue, come prima, peggio di prima [Supplies are to be used up. 
Blood, like before, worse than before], in La Gazzetta del mezzogiorno, 29 July 1996: reporting that in 
Apulia shortages of blood still occur when people goes on vacation.  
197 Despite the mechanism of compensatory token prices set up by the reform, Northern blood 
over-collection is not always able to reach the areas with a shortfall in their blood supply, U.BOLDINI, 
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recently planned by the Health minister in order to arouse public interest toward blood 
giving198.  
It is instead with regard to plasma self-sufficiency that the muddling regulations 
examined above has not given the desired results. The national supply of plasma is more 
than doubled since the 1990 Act, but is still far from achieving the total autarchy sought 
by reformers 199. The machinery for producing Italian AFC has encountered 
insurmountable obstacles in getting started, largely due to the bureaucratic logic endorsed 
by the reform200. Once again, technology seems to go faster than the laws: one may 
predict that the complex machinery set up for achieving the AFC autarchy will soon be 
made obsolete by the progressive wholesale availability of synthetic concentrates201. 
 
Viral Safety in the New Blood System  
A step forward, at least when compared to the past legal framework, is instead the 
new legislative approach to technical regulations addressed to viral control. The past has 
counseled this time to the Parliament the express delegation of the power of introducing 
the rules of detail (for instance: new mandatory measures for blood testing, new screening 
and antiviral treatment, etc.) to the Health Ministry. These delicate measures are now to 
be introduced in the system by Decrees, replacing the negative practice of resorting to 
simple communications. This clear centralization of powers is an attempt to overcome the 
decision-making paralysis that gripped the previous system whenever rapid decisions 
were required in order to cope with a new viral threat or to introduce better and more up-
to-date regulatory standards in the transfusion field (as for plasmapheresis or for blood 
bags)202. It is was pursuing this more flexible philosophy that in the last six years the 
Health Minister restlessly issued the detailed set of regulations that today forces the 
physician in charge of an Italian transfusion center to have the legal bulletin constantly at 
hand203.  
This latter paradox stands for the fact that to date -- following the 1990 Reform -- 
the Health Ministry has enacted well nineteen decrees, which would be even more if all 
the scheduled regulations of detail were issued as envisaged by the Act itself. 
The new rules for blood derivatives safety still rely on ministerial authorizations, 
but it is now specified that only for UE-member country can the national authorization be 
considered equivalent to Italian ex-post certification. A clear requirement is made 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Evoluzione del servizio trasfusione e delle raccolte collettive di sangue, in Il servizio trasfusionale, 1992, 
23.  
198 DM 1 September 1995, in GU 13 October 1995, n.240.  
199 On a national need estimated at 1,200,000 liters of plasma, the Italian fractionated plasma 
increased from 180.000 liters in 1992 to 400.000 in 1996. Yet, import of the two-third of the national need 
of plasma (either in form of AFC or semi-manufactured product) is estimated as for 1996 to cost 
approximately $300 million (see, Italian competition, quoted above).  
200 G.APRILI, G.MARCHIORI, Autosufficienza regionale nel settore degli emoderivati: l’esperienza 
veneta, in 38 TS, 1993, 238, reporting that restitution of AFC from the private plants is often delayed and 
criticizing the inefficient logic of the system, which forces each region to negotiate single agreements with 
the private plants, without having alternatives.  
201 The forum “The EC market in plasma products: a question of circulation” held in Brussels on 
April 1993 had already focused on this possibility. Starting from 1996 the Northern Region of Trento 
sustains the major cost of these new AFC for the sake of total safety of the local hemophiliac population. 
202 A.FLORES, Alcune considerazioni e riflessioni sulla legge n.107, in 36 TS, 1991, 674. 
203 This is not a metaphor, but a personal testimony from an interview made to the head of the 
transfusion center of Trento.  
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concerning the need for batch-by-batch certification, both on the required test on the final 
product and on the testing of plasma donors. This certification on the negative results of 
the prescribed screening must be constantly available for inspection. 
The new transfusion practice standard has been specified by two ministerial 
decrees204. Close attention is paid to donor selection. The (written) informed consent 
principle has been introduced in order to heighten the donors sense of responsibility and 
to ensure a more conscientious approach to the medical interview prior to donation205. 
The preventive testing of donors is made mandatory for: lues, HBaAG, HIV, HCV and 
HIV2206; while exclusion of donors who, although not resulting positive to the hepatitis 
marker test, has a medical history of jaundice is prescribed207. 
How have the measures to date adopted and implemented in Italy reduced the HIV 
risk in blood transfusions? The available data show a progressive decline in the HIV-
incidence rate on yearly tested donations from 0.029 (1985) to 0.004 (1994).  
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Source: 13th Rapporto sul sistema di sorveglianza dello screening delle donazioni di sangue per 
anticorpi anti-HIV presso i centri trasfusionali italiani, Superior Health Institute -- Health 
Ministry, Rome 1995 (data reported for 1994 are not complete). 
 
The same non-aggregated data report that the HIV-incidence rate is ten times 
higher among occasional donors than among periodic ones208, highlighting the crucial 
importance of promoting the spread of a well-established culture of gift among donors. 
The same source reveals that data on the factors of risk among HIV-positive donors show 
a decreasing rate of intravenous drug users (from 32.6% in 1985 to 4.9% in 1994), a slight 
increase in homosexuals (from 13.7% in 1985 to 19.5 in 1994) and a steady HIV-
                                                          
204 DM 27 December 1990 (in GU 24 January 1991, n.20) “Features and standards for blood and 
plasma donation” and DM 15 January 1991 (in GU 24 January 1991, n.20) “Protocols for controls on the 
blood and plasma donors’ fitness”.  
205 It is prescribed that during the interview physicians must inform the donors about the viral risks 
of transmission, thereby ensuring disclosure of information about possible previous infection with viral 
diseases like hepatitis. The same requirement applies with regard to HIV. The donor must read a leaflet 
which itemizes possible symptoms of the infection. Neither the questionnaire nor the leaflet make specific 
reference to homosexuality, while a general attention is paid to a possible sexual promiscuity of the donor. 
206 HCV screening had already been made compulsory by the DM 21 July 1990, in GU 22 August 
1990, n.195), while a subsequent decree did the same for the HIV2 virus in December 1992. 
207 Concerning HTLV I/II virus, epidemiological studies among Italian blood donors have reported 
a very low prevalence (0.00651), see E.MANNELLA ET AL., Prevalenza dell’infezione da HTLV I/II nei 
donatori di sangue, in soggetti politrasfusi e in pazienti affetti da emopatie e nuropatie, in 38 TS, 1993, 123. 
These results have suggested that this further testing should not be made mandatory on Italian donors. 
208 As late as 1991 the press denounced the high risk behavior of those giving blood in order to be 
tested for HIV; see C’è chi offre il sangue per avere un test riservato sull’AIDS, in CDS, 7 June 1991. 
Efforts to spread the message that anyone wishing can be freely and anonymously tested at public health 
facilities have eliminated this hazardous practice. 
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prevalence among apparently no-risk subjects (47.4% in 1985; 48.8 in 1994). Statistics of 
this kind ameliorate the predictive capacity of anamnestic precautions, but are unable to 
quantify the state of the risk (i.e. the likelihood of HIV-contamination for blood 
recipients). Therefore evaluation of the current Italian state of risk must rely on an 
estimation made by a 1990 study which calculated the likelihood of contamination by a 
whole blood unit testing negative on screening at a rate between 0.002% and 0005%209. 
Today this rate is surely much lower, given the progressive shortening of the window 
period due to constant improvements in screening techniques210. 
 
                                                          
209 For this estimate, A.FLORES, L’infezione post-trasfusione da HIV: aspetti epidemiologici, 
diagnostico preventivi e riflessi medico legali, in RIML, 1990, 1075.  
210 The PCR methods is not standard practice in Italian transfusion centers, although experts have 
stressed for the importance of its mandatory adoption (compare, among others, the favorable opinion of the 
ISS Director: G.VICARI, La sicurezza fa un passo avanti, in Plasma & Derivati, n.3, 1995). 
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